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ABSTRACT
Device-independent randomness expansion protocols aim to expand a short uniformlyrandom string into a much longer one whilst guaranteeing that their output istruly random. They are device-independent in the sense that this guarantee does
not dependent on the specifics of an implementation. Rather, through the observation of
nonlocal correlations we can conclude that the outputs generated are necessarily random.
This thesis reports a general method for constructing these protocols and evaluating their
security. Using this method, we then construct several explicit protocols and analyse their
performance on noisy qubit systems. With a view towards near-future quantum technologies,
we also investigate whether randomness expansion is possible using current nonlocality
experiments. We find that, by combining the recent theoretical and experimental advances,
it is indeed now possible to reliably and securely expand randomness.
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INTRODUCTION AND SYNOPSIS
C lassical mechanics offers a deterministic explanation of the macroscopic world. Ifone is able to precisely model a classical system then all future observations aredetermined. Still, if a fair1 coin is tossed behind an agent’s back then, without
additional information, the agent will struggle to correctly predict the outcome more than
50% of the time. Therefore, even though classical mechanics does not prescribe random
events, a lack of predictability can still arise from sufficient ignorance. In stark contrast
to this, quantum mechanics asserts that randomness is a fundamental feature of nature.
In general, for quantum mechanical experiments, even complete knowledge of the system
does not allow one to perfectly predict its outcomes. The existence of truly random events
has profound consequences for applications like cryptography, where the unpredictability
of a random sequence can be imprinted onto data which we wish to keep secret. By using a
source of true randomness, we can ensure that even the most powerful adversaries are not
privy to our secrets.
A demand for randomness was present long before Schrödinger’s cat, with the earliest
evidence of dice dating back several millennia. Ancient Athenians used lotteries as a means
of electing officials [1] and gambling has been a prevalent feature within many historical
cultures. A desire to better understand gambling and games of chance, drove 17th century
mathematicians towards a development of probability theory [2]. Then, as the disciplines of
probability and statistics matured, scientific applications of randomness began to emerge.
For example, random sampling is a key component of hypothesis testing and Monte Carlo
simulations. More recently, owing to the seminal work of Shannon [3], randomness has
found a plethora of applications to information processing and cryptography.
In cryptography one seeks to describe the ability of agents to complete some task whilst
1Here, fair means not purposefully weighted, i.e. the coin’s density is approximately uniform.
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in the presence of an adversary. For example, in a data encryption scheme an agent applies
a randomly selected reversible transformation to some data such that no adversary is able
to deduce the contents of the original data from the transformed data. However, for this to
be possible, we require an additional feature from our source of randomness, namely we
require a notion of privacy. That is, the output of a source of private randomness should
be unpredictable from the perspective of all parties – including any would-be adversaries.
This requirement presents a problem with building a random number generator suitable
for cryptography: how can one ever ensure privacy?
When working with a classical source of randomness then evidently our privacy must
come from some limitations placed on an adversary. Indeed, so-called cryptographically-
secure pseudorandom number generators derive privacy from a computational perspective.
Roughly, these are deterministic algorithms that when fed a short random seed produce a
sequence of numbers that is computationally difficult to distinguish from a source of truly
random numbers. These pseudorandom sources are by far the most commonly used sources,
a consequence of their speed and low implementation costs (they do not require specialist
hardware). However, popularity is not necessarily a good measure of security. In particular,
the derivation of security from a computational perspective places privacy at the mercy
of technological progress. The prime example of this is integer factoring [4], a task widely
believed to be computationally difficult2 was found to admit a polynomial time algorithm
on a quantum computer [5].
Still, even if we base our randomness generation on a computational assumption which
is valid, how can a user of such a source verify that an adversary does not have additional
information that would render its outputs predictable? Without the technical expertise
required to verify the source’s construction, one is left to trust the manufacturer’s claim of
security. However, trust is not always warranted and this assumption could leave a user
at the peril of incompetent or malicious manufacturers. It should be noted that alleged
backdoors in standardised ‘cryptographically-secure’ random number generators have been
reported [6].
Fortunately, the nonlocal characteristic of quantum theory provides a means to ad-
dressing the problem of generating certifiably private randomness. Entangled quantum
systems can exhibit correlations between distant parties that are necessarily random (and
private). Thus, through the observation of these correlations one is able to verify a source
of randomness that is a priori private. Pioneered by the insights of [7,8], this connection
has developed into what is now known as device-independent quantum cryptography: the
study of cryptographic procedures whose security can be established independently of the
internal workings of any devices involved. The cryptographic primitives that have been
tackled in the device independent setting are numerous and ever growing. Much of the early
work [9, 10] focussed on quantum key distribution where two parties look to establish a
2A problem is computationally difficult if it cannot be solved using a polynomial time algorithm.
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secret key between two distant locations. Other primitives that have been analysed include:
randomness amplification [11, 12], the conversion of a source of randomness containing
dependencies into a source of independent random bits; self-testing [13], certifying (up to
local transformations) the internal quantum state and measurements present within some
system; and bit-commitment [14, 15], a scenario wherein one party sends (commits) an
encoded value to another which, at some point later, is revealed.
In this thesis, we focus on the task of randomness expansion. A procedure wherein one
assumes access to a short private source of randomness and attempts to use it to generate a
much larger (still private) source. Randomness expansion was originally proposed in [16,17]
with further development and experimental testing following shortly after [18]. Subsequent
work provided rigorous security proofs against classical adversaries [19, 20]. Security
against quantum adversaries—who may share entanglement with the internal state of
the device—came later [21–23], progressively increasing in noise-tolerance and generality,
with the recently introduced entropy accumulation theorem (EAT) [24,25], on which this
work is based, providing asymptotically optimal rates [26,27]. A new proof technique which
is also asymptotically optimal has recently appeared [28].
The EAT has been applied to several cryptographic tasks [26,27,29–31]. All of these
applications rely, at their core, on the CHSH test of nonlocality [32] or close variants
thereof.3 Special properties of the CHSH test are able to greatly simplify the analysis (for
example, it can be shown that it is sufficient to consider the untrusted devices sharing
qubit systems) [10]. However, these techniques cannot be directly generalized to the vast
majority of other nonlocality tests. With respect for the ethos of device-independence, we
should not assume that we can modify the untrusted devices to better suit the pre-existing
protocols. Instead, in order to maximise randomness throughput, we should look to tailor
the protocols to the devices under consideration.
In [26], it was suggested that one could look to use the device-independent guessing
probability (DIGP) [37–39] in conjunction with the semidefinite hierarchy [40,41] to obtain
computational constructions of particular randomness bounding functions required by the
EAT. In this thesis we detail precisely such a method, allowing us to apply the EAT to a wide
range of nonlocality tests beyond CHSH (including the possibility of looking at multiple
non-locality tests simultaneously and the inclusion of additional parties). We present this
result in the form of a template randomness expansion protocol with security statements
that can be evaluated numerically. Moreover, as this construction is both computationally
efficient and robust, we are able to iteratively fine-tune the template protocol to best fit a
given scenario. We apply the result to several different tests of nonlocality and compare
their randomness expansion rates on entangled qubit pairs subject to noisy detectors.
For each protocol considered we are able to generate close to two bits of randomness per
3In [29] the authors use a multipartite generalisation of CHSH known as an MABK inequality [33–35]
and in [31] the authors use the tilted CHSH inequality [36].
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entangled qubit pair (in the low noise regime).
In order to facilitate the understanding of this thesis, the relevant mathematical
preliminaries have been collated to form Chapter 2. The expert reader may wish to skip this.
The remaining chapters contain the main results of the thesis. Let us briefly summarise
them here.
Chapter 3: In this chapter we introduce and prove security of a template randomness
expansion protocol which can be adapted to the requirements of a user. We achieve this
by establishing a connection between two powerful theoretical tools, the semidefinite
hierarchy [40, 41], which is used to bound the device-independent guessing probability
(DIGP) [37–39], and the entropy accumulation theorem EAT [24,25]. We also provide a full
analysis of the cost of seeding the protocol. In addition, a python package implementing
the construction is provided [42]. This chapter is based on [43].
Chapter 4: In this chapter we apply our technique to several example protocols. In partic-
ular, we look at randomness expansion using the complete empirical distribution as well as
a simple extension of the CHSH protocol, showing noise-tolerant rates of up to two bits per
entangled qubit pair, secure against quantum adversaries. We also compare the achievable
rates for these protocols to the protocol presented in [26] which is based upon a direct
von Neumann entropy bound. Our comparison demonstrates that some of the protocols
from the framework are capable of achieving higher rates than the protocol of [26], in both
the low and high noise regimes. We conclude with a short analysis on the feasibility of
randomness expansion with current experimental technologies. This analysis forms the
theoretical basis of an upcoming manuscript [44].
We conclude in Chapter 5 with a discussion of the results presented and elaborate on some
possible directions of further research.
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PRELIMINARIES
This chapter introduces the relevant mathematical tools required for understandingthe remainder of this thesis. We begin by establishing some of the more generalnotation before providing a quick introduction to quantum information theory in
Sec. 2.1. In Sec. 2.2 we define the relevant entropy measures and following this, in Sec. 2.3,
we introduce several large deviation bounds including the entropy accumulation theorem.
We then overview Bell nonlocality and device-independence in Sec. 2.5 and Sec. 2.6. Finally,
in Sec. 2.7 we finish the preliminary material with an overview of semidefinite programming
and its application to approximating the set of quantum correlations.
Notational conventions
Throughout this work, the calligraphic symbolsA, B, X and Y denote finite sets (alphabets).
We will use the notational shorthand AB to denote the Cartesian product alphabet A×B.
Given two random variables X and X ′, taking values in some common alphabet X , the
statistical distance between X and X ′, is defined as
∆(X , X ′) := 1
2
∑
x∈X
|pX (x)− pX ′(x)|. (2.0.1)
We make frequent use of the bijective mapping between distributions and a subset of
vectors in some real vector space. More specifically, after choosing some orthonormal basis
{eabxy} of R|ABXY | we may identify some distribution p :ABXY→ [0,1] on these alphabets
with the vector p=∑abxy p(a,b, x, y)eabxy. We refer to an element of our vector using the
notation p(a,b, x, y)= p · eabxy. Given some subset of our indexing alphabets, C ⊆ABXY ,
a restriction of p to C, denoted p(C), is the result of applying the map ΠC :R|ABXY |→R|C|
17
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defined by the action on the basis vectors as
ΠC : eabxy 7→
eabxy if (a,b, x, y) ∈ C0 otherwise.
Given an alphabet C and a sequence Cn1 = (ci)ni=1, with ci ∈ C for each i = 1, . . . ,n, we denote
the frequency distribution induced by Cn1 by
FCn1 (x)=
∑n
i=1δxci
n
, (2.0.2)
where δab is the Kronecker delta on the set C. If Cn1 is a sequence of random variables
then we say that Cn1 is i.i.d. if all the random variables in the sequence are independent
and identically distributed. For some event Ω⊆ C, we write P [Ω] to denote the probability
that the event occurs. We denote the set of all probability distributions on the set C by
PC . We shall use a tilde to denote subnormalisation, e.g. p˜ ∈ P˜C denotes a possibly non-
normalised distribution over C,∑c∈C p(c)≤ 1. In certain contexts we may refer to probability
distributions as behaviours or strategies.
For a linear operator M on some Hilbert space H, we define the trace of M to be
Tr[M]=∑x 〈x|M |x〉 where {|x〉} is any orthonormal basis of H. Furthermore, for a linear
operator N on the tensor product of two Hilbert spacesHA⊗HB, we define the partial trace
over system A as TrA [N]=
∑
x(〈x|⊗ 1B)N(|x〉⊗ 1B), where {|x〉}x is an orthonormal basis of
HA . We refer to an operator M ∈L(H) as positive semidefinite if 〈ψ|M |ψ〉 ≥ 0 for all |ψ〉 ∈H.
We denote positive semidefiniteness by M º 0. This relation also induces a partial order on
the space of linear operators (Loewner order), for M, N ∈L(H) we say M ºN if M−N º 0.
We write the natural logarithm as ln(·) and the logarithm base 2 as log(·). The function
sgn(x) :=
0 for x= 0x
|x| otherwise
(2.0.3)
is the sign function for x ∈ R. We will also make use of the notation [n] := {1,2, . . . ,n} for
n ∈N.
2.1 Quantum information
Quantum information theory is the study of information processing tasks on quantum-
mechanical systems. The purpose of this section is to define precisely what we mean by a
quantum system and the physical laws that constrain it. We shall motivate these definitions
from an operational viewpoint, introducing concepts from the perspective of agents (or
experimentalists), typically referred to as Alice and Bob, who are capable of interacting
with these systems. To begin with, we give an abstract definition of a physical system.
Definition 2.1. A physical system is a collection of objects (S,T ,M) that are defined as
follows.
18
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• S – States: Possible values that can be attributed to the internal degrees of freedom
of the system.
• T – Transformations: A collection of mappings T :S→S ′ from the system’s current
state space to another.
• M – Measurements: A collection of mappings M :S→S ′×X , where X is some finite
set labelling the possible outcomes of the measurements. Measurements probe the
internal state of the system, returning some outcome x ∈X and transforming the
system’s state.
Remark 2.1. When dealing with multiple physical systems it will be useful to give them
labels to help with distinguishing. For example, we may refer to systems A and B that
have state spaces S(A) and S(B) respectively. As transformations may alter the state
space of a system (effectively defining a new system), we can also use these labels to keep
track of a system at different times, i.e. A1 may be the initial system then after applying
a transformation or measurement we have a system A2. Systems will be labelled using
upper-case Roman characters.
Let us now introduce the states, transformations and measurements that constitute a
quantum system.
Quantum states
A quantum state is a trace-one positive-semidefinite operator acting on some Hilbert
space H. Unless otherwise stated, a Hilbert space is assumed to be finite dimensional.
We denote the set of all quantum states on the Hilbert space H by S(H). We say a state
ρ ∈S(H) is pure if it satisfies Tr[ρ2]= 1. After identifying some distinguished orthonormal
basis {|x〉}x of H we refer to a state as classical if it is diagonal in this basis, i.e., ρclassical =∑
x p(x) |x〉〈x|. Note that the unit trace condition, combined with the positive semidefinite
property ensures that the vector p = (p(x))x is a probability distribution. Representing
random variables as quantum states allows for us to model standard (discrete) probability
theory using the same language as quantum systems, hence the terminology ‘classical’.
The joint state space of several quantum systems is the state space of the tensor
products of the individual Hilbert spaces. More precisely, if we have a collection of n ∈N
quantum systems with the state space of the ith quantum system being S(Hi), then the
state space of their joint system is S(H1⊗·· ·⊗Hn). We refer to a state ρsep ∈S(H1⊗·· ·⊗Hn)
as separable if it can be written as a convex combination of tensor products of states from
the individual subsystems, that is, ρsep = ∑iλiρ i,1⊗ ·· · ⊗ρ i,n with ∑iλi = 1, λi ≥ 0 and
ρ i, j ∈S(H j) for every (i, j). A state which is not separable is called entangled.
A particular class of states which shall play an important role in the forthcoming work
are so-called classical-quantum (cq) states. We say that a state ρcq ∈S(X E) is a cq-state if it
19
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takes the following form ρcq =∑x p(x) |x〉〈x|⊗ρxE, where {|x〉}x is the distinguished ‘classical’
basis of HX and ρxE ∈S(E) for each x.1 Letting Ω⊆X be an event on the alphabet X , we
define the conditional state (conditioned on the event Ω) by
ρX E|Ω =
1
P [Ω]
∑
x∈Ω
p(x) |x〉〈x|⊗ρxE. (2.1.1)
We denote the identity operator of a system E by 1E.
Quantum channels
The set of allowed transformations (channels) is the set of linear mappings that preserve
the state spaces. Precisely, these are any linear mappings Λ : S(A)→ S(B) which satisfy
the following two properties.
1. Λ is trace-preserving: for any ρA ∈S(A) we have Tr
[
ρA
]=Tr[Λ(ρA)].
2. Λ is completely-positive: for any ρAC ∈S(AC), if ρAC º 0 then (Λ⊗IC)(ρAC)º 0.
These two conditions ensure that all quantum states are mapped to quantum states. This
includes situations when we apply a transformation to only part of a system. Hence, we
require not just positivity but also complete-positivity. We denote the set of all quantum
channels between systems A and B by T (A,B) and we use the shorthand T (A) to denote
T (A, A).
Quantum measurements
A measurement M with outcomes in the set X is described by a collection of positive-
semidefinite operators M = {Mx}x∈X acting on some Hilbert space H. In addition to being
positive, these operators are required to satisfy
∑
x∈X Mx = 1. Applying the measurement M
to a system in the state ρ, we receive the outcome x ∈X with probability p(x)=Tr[ρMx].
We refer to such a measurement as a positive operator valued measure (POVM). If in
addition the measurement operators are also projectors, i.e. M2x =Mx for all x ∈X , we refer
to this as a projection valued measure (PVM). We denote the set of all measurements for a
Hilbert space HA by M(A).
The state transformation accompanying the measurement can be specified by a col-
lection of quantum channels {Λx}x∈X , where Λx is applied to the state upon receiving the
measurement outcome x. The exact structure of the channels associated with a measure-
ment will depend upon the context. For example, physical constraints may dictate that
a system ceases to exist post-measurement. In such a case we can treat the Λx as trivial
channels, i.e. Λx(ρ)= 1 for all x ∈X and ρ ∈S.
1Classical is a contextual concept: the spectral theorem tells us that for any state there exists a basis in
which it is ‘classical’. Rather, given some basis (say, defined by some measurement of interest) we can refer to
states which are classical in this basis.
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Definition 2.2. A quantum system A is a physical system with a state space S(A), the
allowed transformations are quantum channels with domain S(A) and the allowed mea-
surements are M(A) defined for some Hilbert space HA.
The trace norm specifies a norm on the space of linear operators acting on some Hilbert
space. Let H,H′ be two Hilbert spaces and let L(H,H′) be the set of linear operators from
H to H′. Then for any A ∈L(H,H′), the trace norm of A is defined as
‖A‖1 =Tr
[√
A† A
]
. (2.1.2)
From this, we also define the trace distance between two operators A,B ∈ L(H,H′) as
‖A−B‖1.2
Remark 2.2. The trace distance has a useful operational interpretation as a quantity
characterising the distinguishability of two quantum states [45]. Let λ ∈ [0,1] and ρ0,ρ1 ∈
S(H) for some Hilbert space H. Suppose that Alice sends either ρ0 or ρ1 to Bob with
probability λ and 1−λ respectively. Upon receiving the state Bob is allowed to perform a
measurement and subsequently guess which state he was sent.
The trace distance between the two states characterises this optimal probability of
guessing exactly. Precisely, the maximum probability with which Bob can guess correctly is
given by
1
2
+ 1
2
‖λρ0− (1−λ)ρ1‖1.
Furthermore, the measurement that achieves this is projective [46].
2.2 Entropies
In the context of this thesis, ‘entropy’ is semantically equivalent to ‘randomness’ and we
will often use the two terms interchangeably. However, by taking such a linguistic stance
we must remain vigilant of how our definition of randomness is related to the choice of
entropy measure. In the following we precisely pin down our definition of randomness
and its relation to entropy, drawing inspiration from the operational interpretations of the
entropy measures that we introduce.
2.2.1 Classical entropy measures
Entropy, in the information-theoretic setting, was introduced by Shannon in his seminal
work [3]. Guided by several information-theoretic questions, his strive to characterise a
useful measure of information led him to define his now eponymous entropy.
2For classical states this definition coincides with the statistical distance (cf. (2.0.1)) up to a factor of 12 .
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Definition 2.3. Let X be a random variable taking values in X with a probability distri-
bution p. The Shannon entropy of X is
H(X ) :=− ∑
x∈X
p(x) log p(x), (2.2.1)
where we also define 0log0 := 0.3
Remark 2.3. As noted by Shannon, the entropy is defined independently of any meaning
of X , depending only on the underlying distribution. Despite this, we use the standard
notation H(X ) instead of H(p).
Another relevant quantity is that of the self-information (or surprisal) S :X →R∪ {∞},
which is defined as
S(x) :=− log p(x). (2.2.2)
It is related to the Shannon entropy by H(X ) = E [S]. One interpretation of the self-
information is that of a function characterising the amount of surprise experienced by a
rational agent upon observing some outcome x ∈X . That is, − log(p) is a monotonically
decreasing function on the unit interval, with − log(1)= 0 and limp→0+− log(p)=∞: events
that occur with certainty produce no-surprise whereas impossible events are associated
with infinite surprise. Moreover, for independent random variables the surprisal is additive.
From this perspective, we can view the Shannon entropy as a measure of the expected
surprisal experienced by the agent.
Several years later, in [47] Rényi reviewed Shannon’s axioms of a ‘good’ entropy measure
and relaxed what he referred to as the mean value property of entropy. This led him to
define a one-parameter family of entropies which we refer to as the Rényi entropies.
Definition 2.4. Let X be a random variable taking values in X with a probability distri-
bution p and let α ∈ [0,1)∪ (1,∞). Then, the α-Rényi entropy of X is defined as
Hα(X ) := 11−α log
∑
x∈X
pα(x). (2.2.3)
Additionally, we define the limiting cases,
H1(X ) :=H(X ) (2.2.4)
and
H∞(X ) :=min
x∈X
− log p(x). (2.2.5)
Remark 2.4. We refer to the measure H∞ as the min-entropy, denoting it by Hmin.
The Shannon entropy may differ substantially from other Rényi entropies as the follow
example demonstrates.
3This choice follows from the identity lim
x→0+
x log x= 0.
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Example 2.1. Let X be a random bit string of length m, X = {0,1}m, such that
P [X = b]=
1−δ if b= 0
m
δ
2m−1 otherwise
(2.2.6)
for some 0< δ≤ 1/2. For this distribution we have
H(X )= h(δ)+δ log(2m−1)
≈ h(δ)+δm
and
Hmin(X )=− log(1−δ)
where h(δ) :=−δ log(δ)− (1−δ) log(1−δ) is the binary entropy function. Here, we see that
the Shannon entropy grows linearly in the number of bits whereas the min-entropy stays
at a constant value. Furthermore, setting δ= 1/pm and taking the limit m→∞, we have
H(X )→∞ whereas Hmin → 0.
2.2.2 Quantum entropy measures
In the following we generalise the Shannon entropy and min-entropy to quantum systems.
Let ρ ∈S(A) be a quantum state, the von Neumann entropy of ρ is
H(A)ρ :=−Tr
[
ρ log(ρ)
]
. (2.2.7)
If ρ is a classical state, i.e. ρ =∑x p(x) |x〉〈x| for some orthonormal set of vectors {|x〉}x, we
recover the Shannon entropy of the distribution {p(x)}x,
H(A)ρ =−
∑
x
p(x) log p(x). (2.2.8)
For a bipartite state ρAE ∈ S(AE), let ρE = TrA
[
ρAE
]
and define the conditional von
Neumann entropy of system A given system E when the joint system is in state ρAE by
H(A|E)ρ :=H(AE)ρ−H(E)ρ . (2.2.9)
In addition, for a tripartite system ρABE ∈ S(ABE), the conditional mutual information
between A and B given E is defined as
I(A : B|E)ρ :=H(A|BE)ρ−H(A|E)ρ . (2.2.10)
We drop the state subscript whenever the state is clear from the context.
For cq-states it is useful to consider the conditional min-entropy [48] in its operational
formulation [39]. Given a cq-state ρX E =∑x p(x) |x〉〈x|⊗ρxE, the maximum probability with
which an agent holding system E can guess the outcome of a measurement on X is
pguess(X |E) := sup
{Mx}x
∑
x
p(x)Tr
[
MxρxE
]
, (2.2.11)
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where the supremum is taken over all POVMs {Mx}x on system E. Using this we can define
the min-entropy of a classical system given quantum side information as
Hmin(X |E) :=− log
(
pguess(X |E)
)
. (2.2.12)
Another quantity of importance is the ²-smooth conditional min-entropy. Given some
²≥ 0 and ρX E ∈S(X E), the ²-smooth min-entropy H²min is defined as the supremum of the
min-entropy over all states ²-close to ρX E,
H²min(X |E)ρ := sup
ρ′∈B²(ρ)
Hmin(X |E)ρ′ , (2.2.13)
where B²(ρ) is the ²-ball centred at ρ defined with respect to the purified trace distance
(see [49]). The interested reader is referred to [50] for a comprehensive overview of smooth
quantum entropies.
2.3 Large deviation bounds
Let (X i)i∈N be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables, assuming the expectation value exists
let µ= E [X1] and define the partial sum Sn := 1n
∑n
i=1 X i. The law of large numbers, in its
weak and strong forms, establishes a connection between long-term empirical observations
Sn and the expected observation µ. More specifically, the weak law of large numbers states
that [51], for every t> 0 we have
lim
n→∞P
[|Sn−µ| > t]= 0. (2.3.1)
That is, in the limit of infinitely many observations, the probability that the empirical
average Sn deviates from the mean tends to zero. Probabilistic bounds on deviations for
finite n also exist and are known in the wider literature as concentration inequalities,
see [52]. We now introduce two such bounds that will prove useful in the later analysis.
The first is commonly known as the Chernoff bound [53], although we source our
formulation from [54].
Lemma 2.1 (Chernoff bound). Let X i be independent binary random variables for i =
1, . . . ,n, S =∑i X i and µ= E [S]. Then for 0≤ t≤ 1
P
[
S ≥ (1+ t)µ]≤ e−t2µ/3
P
[
S ≤ (1− t)µ]≤ e−t2µ/2 .
Corollary 2.1. For r ≤µ we have P[∣∣S−µ∣∣≥ r]≤ 2e−r2/(3µ).
In addition to this, we also make use of Hoeffding’s inequality [55].
Lemma 2.2 (Hoeffding’s inequality). Let X i be independent random variables, such that
ai ≤ X i ≤ bi with ai,bi ∈R for i = 1, . . . ,n. In addition, let S =∑i X i and µ= E [S]. Then for
t> 0
P
[|S−µ| ≥ t]≤ 2e− 2t2∑i (bi−ai )2 .
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2.3.1 The AEP and its entropic generalisations
A statement analogous to the weak law of large numbers can be made if we consider
the average surprisal of our observations In :=− 1n log p(X1, . . . , Xn). Note that due to the
independence of the random variables we may rewrite the average surprisal as the sum of
the individual surprisals In = 1n
∑n
i=1− log(p(X i)). Writing Yi =− log(p(X i)), we have (Yi)i∈N
is a sequence of independent random variables with E [Y1]=H(X1). Applying the weak law
of large numbers, we find that for all t> 0
lim
n→∞P
[|− 1n log p(X1, . . . , Xn)−H(X )| > t]= 0. (2.3.2)
This result is known as the asymptotic equipartition property (AEP).
An equivalent entropic reformulation of the AEP can be made about the convergence of
smooth Rényi entropies to the Shannon Entropy in the i.i.d. limit, see Chapter 6 in [56] for
a complete discussion regarding this connection. In particular, for the smooth min-entropy
we have
lim
²→0
lim
n→∞
1
n H
²
min(X1, . . . , Xn)=H(X ). (2.3.3)
The advantage of considering the entropic form of the AEP is twofold. Firstly, entropies
are operationally relevant quantities, bounds on their values imply bounds on operational
problems. In addition, the entropic form allows us to avoid the problem of not having a
well-defined generalisation of conditional probability due to the presence of incompatible
joint events in quantum theory. Thus, a generalisation of (2.3.3) to quantum entropies in
the presence of quantum side-information is possible [57]. The main result of [57] may be
summarised as follows: for a quantum state ρ ∈S(AB) consider the i.i.d. state ρ⊗n :=⊗ni=1ρ
on the system AnBn comprised of n copies of AB, then
lim
²→0
lim
n→∞
1
n H
²
min(A
n|Bn)ρ⊗n =H(A|B)ρ. (2.3.4)
Furthermore, for finite n the authors provide an explicit lower bound of the form
1
n H
²
min(A
n|Bn)ρ⊗n ≥H(A|B)ρ− cpn , (2.3.5)
where c is a constant dependent on ² but independent of n. Lower bounds on the smooth
min-entropy are of critical importance to later applications (c.f. Sec. 2.4).
Remark 2.5. The above bound (2.3.5) illustrates the power of entropy smoothing. Recall in
Example 2.1 we saw that the Shannon entropy could be made to be arbitrarily larger than
the min-entropy. The AEP states that for a long enough sequence of i.i.d. experiments we
can account for this difference by smoothing. Intuitively, this can be seen as a consequence
of typicality [51]. That is, for sufficiently large n almost all of the mass of pX n1 will be on
the typical set An
δ
:= {xn1 ∈X n | 2−n(H(X )+δ) ≤ p(xn1 )≤ 2−n(H(X )−δ)}. Therefore, one can find a
distribution close to pX n1 such that
1
n Hmin(X
n
1 )&H(X )−δ.
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2.3.2 The entropy accumulation theorem
The final bound in the previous subsection (2.3.5) is structured in a manner that is particu-
larly appealing for our purposes. It lower bounds a global quantity of interest H²min(A
n|Bn)
in terms of smaller, more easily computable quantities H(A|B)ρ . Unfortunately, the bound is
derived from the assumption of an i.i.d. structure to the sequence of experiments. This i.i.d.
assumption in cryptography is overly restrictive. When characterising the possible actions
of an adversary we would much rather be overly generous than overly restrictive.4 Thus, we
look for a bound similar to (2.3.5) which is derived from weaker assumptions. Fortunately,
this is precisely what the entropy accumulation theorem (EAT) provides [24,25].
The EAT relaxes the i.i.d. assumption by replacing it with a structural assumption
which states that the random experiments are performed sequentially. That is, we conduct
experiment one, then experiment two, then three and so on. The only additional a priori
restriction that the sequential scenario imposes is that we should be able to explain any
dependencies between two experiments by the information present at the earlier one. The
remaining part of this section is dedicated to precisely defining this sequential interaction
and stating the generalisation of (2.3.5) offered to us by the EAT. It should be noted here
that we are not considering the EAT in its full generality, but a restricted version tailored
to our application, e.g. some systems will be restricted to be classical.
In the sequential scenario our experiment begins with a bipartite system R0E in a
(possibly entangled) quantum state ρR0E ∈S(R0E). We can think of the subsystem R0 as
the initial system in our laboratory, i.e. the system with which we shall be interacting
sequentially. Whereas, system E refers to a system held by an adversary. During each
interaction some classical systems A i X iCi will be produced along with a quantum system
Ri. The sequential interaction is then described by the application of a sequence of quantum
channels (Ni⊗IE)ni=1, where Ni :S(Ri−1)→S(A i X iCiRi) which transform the system in
the laboratory to produce the relevant experimental data. We refer to the channels used as
EAT channels and the following definition gives their precise characterisation.
Definition 2.5 (EAT channels). A set of EAT channels {Ni}ni=1 is a collection of quantum
channels Ni :S(Ri−1)→S(A i X iCiRi) such that for each i ∈ [n]:
1. A i, X i and Ci are finite dimensional classical systems. Moreover, the state of Ci is a
deterministic function of the states of A i and X i. Ri is an arbitrary quantum system.
2. For any initial state ρR0E, the final state ρAn1 X n1 E =TrCn1 Rn
[
((Nn ◦ · · · ◦N1)⊗IE)ρR0E
]
obeys the collection of conditional independence constraints I(A i−11 : X i|X i−11 E)= 0.
Remark 2.6. The EAT channels formalise the notion of interaction within the protocol.
The first constraint is a straightforward restriction on the nature of the information
4Furthermore, any innocent fluctuations in the experimental setup would render the i.i.d. assumption
invalid.
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present within the experiment. In the applications to come one can interpret these systems
as follows: the systems (A i) refer to outputs of measurements on the quantum systems
(Ri−1) present in the laboratory at the beginning of the ith interaction, we will use the
EAT to bound the total entropy of these systems; the systems (X i) correspond to any
additional classical information entering the experiment during each interaction, e.g. a
choice of measurement to make on the laboratory’s system; finally (Ci) are systems that
help evaluate the quality of the data produced during the interaction, e.g. the evaluation of
some Bell-inequality for (A i, X i). We refer to the Ci systems as scores. Crucially, we will be
able to evaluate our lower bound on the total entropy accumulated whilst conditioning on
the observation of some event, i.e. Cn1 ∈Ω. For example, this could be the observation of a
sufficiently large average score.
The independence constraints impose the idea that the outputs generated in the sequen-
tial interactions should only depend upon the information present up to that point in time.
If these conditional independence conditions were abandoned then we could artificially
construct these dependencies by choosing X i+1 based upon the value of some past output A i.
An explicit example showing the necessity of this condition for the general EAT statement
is provided in the appendix of [24].
To fully state the EAT we require one additional object known as a min-tradeoff function.
Such a function acts as a lower bound on the minimum von Neumann entropy accrued
during a single interaction when we presuppose that the score will behave according to
some distribution. Formally, it is defined as follows.
Definition 2.6 (Min-tradeoff function). LetNi be an EAT channel and let R′ be a quantum
system isomorphic to the system Ri−1. A min-tradeoff function for the channel Ni is an
affine function fmin :PC→R satisfying
fmin(p)≤ inf
ω∈Σp
H(A i|X iR′)Ni(ω) (2.3.6)
where
Σp :=
{
ω ∈S(Ri−1R′) : (Ni⊗IR′)(ω)Ci =
∑
c
p(c) |c〉〈c|
}
. (2.3.7)
When Σp =; the infimum is defined to be +∞. For a given min-tradeoff function fmin, we
are also concerned about the following properties.
• Maximum over all distributions:
Max[ fmin] := max
p∈PC
fmin(p). (2.3.8)
• Minimum over all distributions:
Min[ fmin] := min
p∈PC
fmin(p). (2.3.9)
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• Minimum over all Σ-compatible distributions:
MinΣ[ fmin] := min
p:Σp 6=;
fmin(p). (2.3.10)
• Maximum variance over all Σ-compatible distributions:
VarΣ[ fmin] := max
p:Σp 6=;
∑
c
p(c) ( fmin(δc)− fmin(p))2 . (2.3.11)
Remark 2.7. As a min-tradeoff function f is an affine function, we may decompose its
action on a probability distribution p as f (p)=∑c p(c) f (δc).
The sequential interaction scenario imposes little structure on the experiment: we have
a sequence of experiments obeying some statistical properties. At the end of the experiment
we will have collected the statistics Cn1 , which gives rise to a frequency distribution over
the set C which we denote by FCn1 . Loosely, the EAT states that the total entropy gained
throughout the series of interactions should, with high probability, be close to the minimum
entropy accumulated in a series of experiments whose scores are all i.i.d. according to FCn1 .
The EAT was originally stated in [24], here we use the recently improved statement [25]
wherein a better error dependence was established.
Theorem 2.2 (EAT).
Let (Ni)ni=1 be a collection of EAT channels and let ρAn1 X n1 Cn1 E =TrRn
[
((Nn ◦ · · · ◦N1)⊗IE)ρR0E
]
be the output state after the sequential application of the channels (Ni⊗IE)i to some input
state ρR0E. Let Ω⊆ Cn be some event that occurs with probability pΩ and let ρ|Ω be the final
state conditioned on Ω occurring. Finally let ²s ∈ (0,1) and fmin be a min-tradeoff function
for each (Ni)i. If for all Cn1 ∈Ω, with P
[
Cn1
]> 0, we have fmin(FCn1 )≥ t for some t ∈ R then
for any β ∈ (0,1) we have
H²smin(A
n
1 |X n1 E)ρ|Ω > nt−n(²V +²K )−²Ω, (2.3.12)
where
²V := β ln22
(
log
(
2|A|2+1)+√VarΣ[ fmin]+2 )2 , (2.3.13)
²K := β
2
6(1−β)3 ln2 2
β(log |A|+Max[ fmin]−MinΣ[ fmin]) ln3
(
2log |A|+Max[ fmin]−MinΣ[ fmin]+e2
)
(2.3.14)
and
²Ω :=
1
β
(1−2log(pΩ ²s)) . (2.3.15)
2.4 Randomness extraction
Many applications require some source of uniform (or almost uniform) random bits. How-
ever, it may be the case that we only have access to a source of partially random bits. In
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addition, these bits may not be independent of each other or, worse, they may be correlated
with some other random source held by an adversary. Randomness extractors are proce-
dures that allow us to process partially random sources into sources of independent and
uniformly random bits.
The first extractor is attributed to von Neumann [58] who proposed a simple method for
converting a source of biased but i.i.d. random bits into a uniformly random source.5 More
modern extractors began with technical results like the leftover hash lemma (LHL) [59].
The LHL states that if our partially random source of bits has min-entropy larger than k> 0
and we apply a function chosen randomly from a set of pairwise-independent universal hash
functions6 then the resulting bit string is approximately uniformly distributed over {0,1}k.
This result was later extended to the case where our random source may be correlated with
some quantum system [60], proving that the results of quantum measurements could also
be used as a source of extractable randomness. We now present the formal definition of a
randomness extractor that will be used throughout the rest of this thesis. This definition
is the combination of Lemma 3.5 from [61] and the quantum-proof randomness extractor
definition presented in [62].
Definition 2.7 (Quantum-proof strong extractor). We say that a function Rext : {0,1}n×
{0,1}d → {0,1}r is a quantum-proof (k,²ext+2²s)-strong extractor, if for all cq-states ρX E
with H²smin(X |E)ρ ≥ k for some ²s > 0 it maps ρX E⊗τd to ρ′Rext(X ,D)DE where
1
2
‖ρ′Rext(X ,D)DE−τr⊗τd⊗ρE‖1 ≤ ²ext+2²s, (2.4.1)
where τr is the maximally mixed state on a system of dimension 2r.
Although in general the amount of randomness extracted will depend on the extractor,
H²smin(A
n
1 B
n
1 |E) provides an upper bound on the total number of ²s-close to uniform bits that
can be extracted from An1 B
n
1 and a well-chosen extractor will result in a final output bit-
string of length r ≈H²smin(An1 Bn1 |E). We denote any loss of entropy incurred by the extractor
by `ext = k− r. Entropy loss will differ between extractors but in general it will be some
function of the extractor error, the seed length and the initial quantity of smooth min-
entropy. The extractor literature is rich with explicit constructions, with many following
Trevisan’s framework [63]. For an in-depth overview of randomness extraction, we refer
the reader to [64] and references therein.
5His idea is as follows: take the outputs of the source and group them into pairs. Each pair (b1,b2) takes one
of four possible values {00,01,10,11} and, as the sequence was produced in an i.i.d. manner, P [(b1,b2)= (0,1)]=
P [(b1,b2)= (1,0)]. If we discard all pairs taking values (0,0) or (1,1) we are left with a sequence of uniformly
random i.i.d. binary-outcome events.
6Here, a hash function is just some map h : {0,1}n → {0,1}k where n is the number of bits produced by
our partially random source. In addition, we say a collection of hash functions H is a pairwise-independent
universal family if for all x, y ∈ {0,1}n with x 6= y if we select h ∈H uniformly at random then we have (h(x),h(y))
is uniformly distributed over {0,1}2k.
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BobAlice
Λ
X Y
A B
Figure 2.1: An artist’s interpretation of two agents conducting a Bell-test.
Remark 2.8. By using a strong quantum-proof extractor, the output of the extractor will
remain uncorrelated with the string used to seed it. Since the seed acts like a catalyst,
we need not be overly concerned with the amount required. Furthermore, if available, it
could just be acquired from a trusted public source immediately prior to extraction without
compromising security.
2.5 Bell Nonlocality
Consider the following scenario (see Fig. 2.1) wherein two agents, Alice and Bob, are
tasked with generating distant correlations. At the beginning of the experiment they will
be separated and unable to communicate.7 They will then each receive a symbol, Alice
receives some x ∈X and Bob receives some y ∈Y , chosen independently of the rest of the
experiment. We denote the symbols which Alice and Bob receive by the random variables
X and Y respectively. After receiving X and Y , they will each announce another symbol,
A and B chosen from the sets A and B respectively. The outcome of a single run of the
experiment, i.e. the tuple (A,B, X ,Y ), can be modelled by some conditional probability
distribution pAB|XY .8
The separation of the agents enforces what are known as no-signalling constraints on
the distribution p,
∑
a
p(a,b|x, y)= p(b|y), for each b, x and y, (2.5.1)∑
b
p(a,b|x, y)= p(a|x), for each a, x and y. (2.5.2)
7This assumption can be physically justified through spacelike separation of the two agents.
8The distribution over the inputs is fixed and cannot be influenced by the agents. Our attention is therefore
focussed on the conditional distribution: we want to observe how the agents act upon receiving different inputs.
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That is, the input received by one agent cannot influence the marginal distribution of the
other agent.
Note that we allow the two agents, prior to being separated, to discuss how they
will react upon receiving their inputs e.g. they could exchange some random bit string
which would influence their choice of responses. What we are assuming here is that any
dependencies between the outcomes A and B must be mediated by some underlying hidden
random variable (HRV) Λ that was shared prior to the experiment. Mathematically, this
corresponds to their probability distribution decomposing as
p(a,b|x, y)= ∑
λ∈Λ
q(λ)p(a|x, y,λ)p(b|x, y,λ)
= ∑
λ∈Λ
q(λ)p(a|x,λ)p(b|x,λ),
(2.5.3)
where on the second line we used the assumption that A is independent of Y and B is
independent of X .
Henceforth, a behaviour refers to a bipartite conditional probability distribution of the
form {p(a,b|x, y)}abxy with (a,b, x, y) ∈ABXY which satisfies the no-signalling constraints
(2.5.1) and (2.5.2). We denote the set of local behaviours, i.e. those which can be decomposed
as (2.5.3), by L. The set of local behaviours forms a bounded convex polytope in R|ABXY |.
Convex polytopes can be described in two equivalent ways: either as the convex hull of a set
of extremal vertices or as the intersection of a collection of halfspaces, with the halfspaces
being defined by the hyperplanes that lie across the facets of the polytope. For the polytope
L, the extremal vertices are the deterministic behaviours [65], i.e. a behaviour of the form
p(a,b|x, y)= p(a|x)p(b|y) with p(a|x), p(b|y) ∈ {0,1} for each (a,b, x, y) ∈ABXY .
Whilst the vertex-description of L is simple to define, it is the halfspace description that
has proven vastly more useful in practice.9 Consider a hyperplane H that rests on a facet
of L, it may be written as {p ∈ R|ABXY | |∑a,b,x,y sabxy p(a,b|x, y) = c} for some sabxy, c ∈ R.
This hyperplane defines the linear functional S : p 7→∑a,b,x,y sabxy p(a,b|x, y) such that for
p ∈ L we have S(p) ≤ c.10 This necessary criterion for membership of L is known as a
Bell-inequality and its usefulness comes from the fact that checking S(p)> c is sufficient to
conclude p ∉L.
In his seminal work, [67], Bell extended the EPR argument [68] to conclude that
the predictions of quantum theory could not always be described by the LHV model, i.e.,
quantum theory allows for probability distributions that cannot be decomposed in the
manner depicted in (2.5.3). Such distributions are referred to as nonlocal. Since then, a
plethora of work has been devoted to the study of nonlocality from both the foundational
9The process of converting a vertex description of a polytope to a hyperplane description is known as facet
enumeration. Whilst polynomial time algorithms exist [66], a significant problem is that the number of vertices
scales exponentially in the size of the input-output alphabets – the number of deterministic distributions is
|A||X ||B||Y |.
10We will always have the our inequalities directed in this way. If required, we can make the replacements
sabxy 7→ −sabxy and c 7→ −c.
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perspective as well as its implications for information processing tasks. We refer the
reader to [69] and references therein for a broad overview of the topic. We refer to a
behaviour p as quantum, denoted by p ∈Q, if there exists a Hilbert space HAB, a density
operator ρ ∈S(AB) and a collection of POVMs, {{Fa|x}a∈A}x∈X and {{Gb|y}b∈B}y∈Y such that
p(a,b|x, y)= Tr[ρ(Fa|x⊗Gb|y)] for each (a,b, x, y) ∈ABXY . Finally, the set of behaviours
that are restricted only by the no-signalling constraints is denoted by N.
Example 2.2 (CHSH). Let us consider the simplest non-trivial example of Bell-nonlocality,
where A = B = X = Y = {0,1}. In this scenario there is a unique (up to relabelling) Bell
inequality, the CHSH inequality [32]. The inequality takes the form
〈A0B0〉+〈A0B1〉+〈A1B0〉−〈A1B1〉 ≤ 2, (2.5.4)
where
〈
AxBy
〉
:= ∑ab(−1)a⊕b p(a,b|x, y) for each x, y ∈ {0,1}. Its maximum violation for
quantum systems, known as its Tsirelson bound [70], is 2
p
2 .
Remark 2.9. The crucial property of nonlocal correlations, that enables their application to
cryptographic tasks, is the fact that they imply the existence of private randomness [9,71].
More precisely, let p be a behaviour such that p ∉L. Then, by the definition of L, there
cannot exist a random variable Λ such that conditioned on knowing the value of Λ, A is a
deterministic function of X and B is a deterministic function of Y . Thus, for some values of
(x, y) we have maxab p(a,b|x, y,Λ)< 1 and therefore private randomness.
2.5.1 Nonlocal games
An alternative way of thinking about Bell-experiments is through the guise of a nonlocal
game. From this viewpoint, a Bell-experiment is a cooperative game wherein two agents
are separated and then a referee sends each agent a question to which they respond with
an answer. Based upon their interaction, the two agents receive a score which is a function
of their question and answers.
Definition 2.8. Let A,B,X ,Y and V be finite sets. A (two-player) nonlocal game G =
(µ,V ) (on ABXY) consists of a set of question pairs (x, y) ∈XY chosen according to some
probability distribution µ : XY → [0,1], a set of answer pairs (a,b) ∈AB and a scoring
function V :ABXY→V .
Remark 2.10. We will abuse notation and use the symbol G to refer to both the nonlocal
game and the set of possible scores. I.e., we may refer to the agents receiving a score c ∈G.
Furthermore, we denote the number of different scores by |G|.
As before, the actions of our agents are modelled by some conditional probability
distribution p ∈N, which we may refer to as a strategy. By playing according to the strategy
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p, the agents induce a frequency distribution ωG over the set of possible scores. That is,
ωG(c)=
∑
abxy
µ(x, y)p(a,b|x, y)δV (a,b,x,y),c (2.5.5)
for each c ∈ G. We denote the set of possible frequency distributions achievable by the
agents whilst playing according to quantum strategies by QG .
Example 2.3 (CHSH game). We may recast the CHSH inequality as a nonlocal game. In
this game µ is the uniform distribution over XY and the scoring function is
V (a,b, x, y)=
1 if a⊕b= xy0 otherwise. (2.5.6)
Interpreting a score of 1 as a win, the maximum probability with which the agents can win
the CHSH game whilst using a local strategy is
sup
p∈L
ω(1)= 34
and whilst playing according to a quantum behaviour is
sup
p∈Q
ω(1)= 12 +
p
2
4 .
We finish this section with another example of a nonlocal game, one which will be
important for the analysis later in the thesis.
Example 2.4 (Extended CHSH game (GCHSH)). The extended CHSH game has appeared
already in the device-independent literature [26, 72, 73]. It extends the standard CHSH
game to include a correlation check between one of Alice’s CHSH inputs and an additional
input from Bob. It is defined by the question-answer sets X = {0,1}, Y = {0,1,2} and
A=B = {0,1}, the scoring set V = {cCHSH, calign,0} and the scoring rule
VCHSH(a,b, x, y) :=

cCHSH if x · y= a⊕b and y 6= 2
calign if (x, y)= (0,2) and a⊕b= 0
0 otherwise.
(2.5.7)
The input distribution we consider is defined by µCHSH(x, y)= 18 for (x, y) ∈ {0,1}2, µCHSH(0,2)=
1
2 and µCHSH(x, y) = 0 otherwise. This game is equivalent to choosing to play either the
CHSH game or the game corresponding to checking the alignment of the inputs (0,2) uni-
formly at random and then proceeding with the chosen game. The frequency distribution
then tells us the relative frequencies with which we win each game. The motivation behind
GCHSH can be understood by considering a schematic of an ideal implementation on a
bipartite qubit system as given in Fig. 2.2. If we observe the maximum winning probability
for the CHSH game, as well as perfect alignment for the inputs (0,2), then the inputs
(x˜, y˜)= (1,2) should produce two perfectly uniform bits.
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Figure 2.2: A measurement schematic for a qubit implementation of GCHSH. Measurements
are depicted in the x-z plane of the Bloch-sphere with σϕ = cos(ϕ)σz+sin(ϕ)σx for ϕ ∈ (−pi,pi].
Using the maximally entangled state |ψ〉AB = (|00〉 + |11〉)/
p
2 with the measurements
depicted, one has a frequency distribution of ωG = 12
(
1
2 +
p
2
4 ,1,
1
2 −
p
2
4
)
, where the scores
are ordered (cCHSH, calign,0). The setup achieves Tsirelson’s bound for the CHSH game
as well as perfect correlations for the X = 0 and Y = 2 inputs. In addition, self-testing
results [74] give a converse result: these scores completely characterize the devices up to
local isometries. This implies that the state used by the devices is uncorrelated with an
adversary and that the measurement pair (X ,Y )= (1,2) yields uniformly random results,
certifying the presence of 2 bits of private randomness in the outputs.
2.5.2 Loopholes
Loopholes in Bell-experiments are failures to exactly adhere to the given assumptions.
In such a situation, the conclusions that we are able to draw from our observations are
naturally subject to change. We shall now review two loopholes that will influence how
we conduct the later analysis, for an in-depth discussion of the various loopholes in Bell-
experiments we refer the reader to [75]. It should also be noted at this point that loophole-
free11 Bell-experiments have been performed [76–78].
Locality loophole
In a Bell-experiment we made the explicit assumption that, once separated, neither
agent is capable of sending information to the other. This is often referred to as an as-
sumption of locality: the result of one agent’s experiment should not be influenced by the
actions of another distant agent. This supersedes the assumption that the agents input
11Well, one can never rule out superdeterminism, but we won’t discuss that here: the universe forbids it.
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choices are independent of one another – this is also sometimes referred to separately as
an assumption of free choice. The concept of a ‘distant agent’ can be made precise, we say
agent B is distant from agent A if agent B is located at a spacetime point outside of the
causal past of agent A.
When conducting a Bell-experiment we do not observe the underlying joint distribution
that governs the observed statistics. Instead, we are only privy to an empirical distribution.
Due to the effects of finite statistics, coupled with the fact that we cannot guarantee that
the experiment’s statistics were produced in an i.i.d. manner, we are unable to retroactively
check that the locality assumption was upheld, e.g. by attempting to factor the distribution
as per (2.5.1) and (2.5.2). Therefore, we must trust that the experiment performed upheld
this assumption. In practice, this is done by forcing spacelike separation of the parties
during interactions.12
Detection loophole
Suppose that during one of the trials of a Bell-experiment an input is provided to a
device but the device fails to produce an output. What data should be recorded for this trial?
Those of a non-conspiratorial disposition may be inclined to ignore the trial. However, such
an action opens what is sometimes referred to as the post-selection, detection or coincidence
loophole.13 To highlight the problem, consider the following example wherein we have two
agents play the CHSH game. Their strategy is simple, always output zero; except, when
agent A receives the input 1 from the referee, then agent A refuses to respond. By ignoring
these events, the only question pairs that contribute to the game score are (0,0) and (0,1)
and for these question pairs a joint response of (A,B)= (0,0) will result in a score of 1. By
post-selecting on certain inputs, one can guarantee to win the game on all recorded runs.
In order to close the detection loophole one must take all of the trials into account. The
most general method for doing so is to introduce a new symbol A ( B ), which is recorded
when Alice’s (Bob’s) detection event fails. This method increases the size of the output
alphabets A 7→A∪ { A } and B 7→B∪ { B }, opening up the possibility of using different Bell-
inequalities. However, the original Bell-inequality may also be used by ‘lifting’ it to the
new scenario [79]. Alternatively, instead of introducing a new symbol, one can record a
pre-existing outcome upon observing a failed detection event. Whilst this is clearly less
general than the previous method, there are contexts in which it may be advantageous to
not increase the size of the output alphabets. For example, when optimizing over probability
distributions achieving some Bell-inequality violation a larger alphabet results in a more
12In cryptographic scenarios we must assume that our devices cannot signal to an adversary, otherwise
secrecy is non-existent. We can therefore extend this assumption to include that the devices within the
laboratory do not signal to each other – if we can block the devices from signalling to an adversary then we
should be able to block them from signalling to each other. As such, we do not look to close the locality loophole
within our randomness expansion protocols.
13The various terms come from deficiencies in different implementations of Bell-experiments. However,
they are all concerned with the same problem of incomplete data.
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computationally intensive problem (see Appendix A).
2.6 Device-independence
Device-independence is a paradigm in which one attempts to draw conclusions about the
outcomes of information processing tasks whilst relying as little as possible on the specific
details of their implementation.14 Instead, one looks to use readily available information to
try and infer properties about the outcomes of some procedure. For example, as was noted
in Remark 2.9, we may use the observation of nonlocal correlations to certify the existence
of private randomness. Crucially, this can be done without reference to the actual system
used to generate the nonlocal correlations, we need only to check that the assumptions
required for a Bell-experiment are upheld to ensure the privacy.
Within a device-independent protocol, tasks are completed through a series of interac-
tions with some untrusted devices. A device D refers to some physical system that receives
classical inputs and produces classical outputs. Describing such systems in the language of
Def. 2.2, inputs correspond to a choice of state preparation and/or measurement procedure
and the outputs would be the results of some measurements performed on the system. We
say that D is untrusted if the mechanism by which D produces the outputs from the inputs
is unknown. During the protocol, the agents interact with their untrusted devices within
the following scenario:15
1. The protocol is performed within the confines of a secure lab from which information
can be prevented from leaking.
2. This lab can be partitioned into two disconnected sites (one controlled by Alice and
one by Bob).
3. The agents can send information freely and securely between these sites, Moreover,
they are capable of preventing any unwanted information transfer between the
sites.16
4. The agents each have their own device to which they can provide inputs (taken from
alphabets X and Y) and receive outputs (from alphabets A and B).
5. These devices operate according to quantum theory, i.e., pAB|XY ∈ QAB|XY . Any
eavesdropper is also limited by quantum theory. We useDABE to denote the collection
of devices (including any held by an eavesdropper).
14Of course, we must make some assumptions about the implementation. For example, in cryptographic
schemes we assume that our secrets are not broadcast to an adversary, else cryptography is a moot concept.
Rather, device-independence strives to make as few assumptions about the implementation as possible.
15One does not have to recreate this scenario exactly in order to perform the protocol. Instead, the given
scenario establishes one situation in which the protocol remains secure.
16This imposes the locality restriction required for Bell-experiments.
36
2.6. DEVICE-INDEPENDENCE
6. The user has an initial source of private random numbers and a trusted computer for
classical information processing.
One of the main advantages a device-independent protocol possesses over other cryp-
tographic procedures, are its minimalist assumptions on the implementation. Moreover,
through the observation of nonlocal correlations it has the capability of determining whether
or not the untrusted devices are performing adequately. The protocols hence remain imper-
vious to many side-channel attacks, malfunctioning devices or prior tampering.
2.6.1 The device-independent guessing probability problem
In the device-independent scenario we do not know the quantum states or measurements
being performed. Instead, our entire knowledge about these must be inferred from the
observed input-output behaviour of the devices used. In particular, observing correlations
that violate a Bell-inequality provides a coarse-grained characterisation of the underlying
system. As formulated in the definition of the min-entropy, the guessing probability (2.2.11)
is not a device-independent quantity because its computation requires knowledge of the
states ρxE. However, the guessing probability can be reformulated in a device-independent
way [37,38,80,81].
Consider a tripartite system ρABE shared between two devices in the agents’ lab and
Eve. Because we are assuming an adversary limited by quantum theory, we can suppose
that, upon receiving some inputs (x, y) ∈XY , the devices work by performing measurements
{Ea|x}a and {Fb|y}b respectively, which give rise to some probability distribution p ∈QAB|xy,
and the overall state post-measurement is the cq-state
∑
ab
p(a,b|x, y) |a〉〈a|⊗ |b〉〈b|⊗ρabxyE ,
where
ρ
abxy
E =
TrAB
[
(Ea|x⊗Fb|y⊗ 1E)ρABE
]
Tr
[
(Ea|x⊗Fb|y⊗ 1E)ρABE
] .
Note that the agents are not aware of the inner workings of the devices, they only observe
the results of the measurements on their systems.
Consider the best strategy for Eve to guess the value of AB using her system E.
She can perform a measurement on her system to try to distinguish the ensemble of
states {ρabxyE }ab. Denoting Eve’s POVM {Me}e with outcomes in one-to-one correspon-
dence with the values AB can take (say eab being the value corresponding to a best
guess of AB = (a,b))17, then given some values of a,b, x and y, Eve’s outcomes are dis-
tributed as p(ea′b′ |a,b, x, y)=Tr
[
Mea′b′ρ
abxy
E
]
, and her probability of guessing correctly is
17Without loss of generality we can assume Eve’s measurement has as many outcomes as what she is trying
to guess.
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p(eab|a,b, x, y)=Tr
[
Meabρ
abxy
E
]
. For a fixed quantum strategy q= {ρABE, {Ea|x}, {Fb|y}}, the
overall probability of guessing AB correctly given E and XY = (x, y) is
pguess(AB|x, y,E, q)= sup
{Me}e
∑
ab
Tr
[
(Ea|x⊗Fb|y⊗Meab )ρABE
]
= sup
{Me}e
∑
ab
p(a,b, eab|x, y, q)
= sup
{Me}e
∑
ab
p(eab|a,b, x, y, q)p(a,b|x, y, q) .
Note that the guessing probability depends on the inputs x, y. In the protocols that we will
consider later, there will only be one pair of inputs for which Eve is interested in guessing
the outputs. We denote these inputs by x˜ and y˜.
In the device-independent scenario, Eve can also optimize over all quantum states
and measurements that could be used by the devices. However, she wants to do so while
restricting the devices to obey certain relations which the agents will be using to check the
quality of their devices (for example, the agents may look for a CHSH violation greater
than some value). For the moment, without specifying these relations precisely, call the set
of quantum states and measurements obeying these relations R. Hence, we seek
pguess(AB|x˜, y˜,E)= sup
q∈R,{Me}e
∑
ab
p(a,b|x˜, y˜, q)p(eab|a,b, x˜, y˜, q) .
Because Eve’s measurement commutes with those of the devices (due to no signalling), we
can use Bayes’ rule to rewrite the optimization as18
sup
q∈R,{Me}e
∑
ab
p(eab|x˜, y˜, q)p(a,b|eab, x˜, y˜, q) .
With this rewriting it is evident that we can think about Eve’s strategy as follows: Eve
randomly chooses a value of E = e and then prepares the device according to the choice e,
trying to bias A,B towards the values a,b corresponding to the chosen e. We can hence
write
pguess(AB|x˜, y˜,E)= sup
{pe}e
∑
ab
P [E = eab] peab (a,b|x˜, y˜, q) ,
where
∑
e p(e)pe satisfies some relations (equivalent to the restriction to the set R) and
pe ∈QAB|XY for each e.
The constraints imposed for the remainder of this thesis are those implied by assuming
an expected frequency distribution ω for some nonlocal game G, e.g.∑
abxy
µ(x, y)p(a,b|x, y)δV (a,b,x,y),c =ω(c)
for each c ∈ G. Note that these constraints are linear functions of the probabilities pe.
The optimization is then a conic program (the set of un-normalized quantum-realisable
18This rewriting makes sense provided no information leaks to Eve during the protocol, which is reasonable
for randomness expansion since it takes place in a single secure laboratory.
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distributions forms a convex cone). By introducing the subnormalised distributions p˜e =
P [E = e]pe, the problem can be expressed as
sup
{p˜e}e
∑
ab
p˜eab (a,b|x˜, y˜)
subj. to
∑
e
∑
abxy
µ(x, y)pe(a,b|x, y)δV (a,b,x,y),c =ω(c) ∀c ∈G
p˜e ∈ Q˜AB|XY ∀ e .
(2.6.1)
Note that the normalization constraint on
∑
e p˜e is implied by the nonlocal game constraints
as
∑
cω(c)= 1.
Example 2.5. The guessing probability program for a pair of devices playing the CHSH
game with an expected winning probability of ω ∈
[
3
4 ,
1
2 +
p
2
4
]
is
sup
{p˜e}e
∑
ab
p˜eab (a,b|x˜, y˜)
subj. to
1
4
∑
abxy:
a⊕b=xy
∑
e
pe(a,b|x, y)=ω
1
4
∑
abxy:
a⊕b 6=xy
∑
e
pe(a,b|x, y)= 1−ω
p˜e ∈ Q˜AB|XY ∀ e .
Optimizing over the set of quantum correlations is a difficult problem, in part because
the dimension of the quantum system achieving the optimum could be arbitrarily large. In
order to get around this problem we consider a computationally tractable relaxation of the
problem, which the next subsection is dedicated to introducing.
2.7 Semidefinite programming
This final section of the preliminaries covers the topic of semidefinite programs (SDPs). We
will briefly introduce the general topic before covering a particular application which will
allow us to make the optimization problem (2.6.1) computationally tractable. We denote
the set of symmetric n×n real-valued matrices by Sn(R).
2.7.1 The basics
Definition 2.9 (Primal SDP). Let C,F1, . . . ,Fr ∈Sn(R) and b1, . . . ,br ∈R. The collection
(C,F1, . . . ,Fr,b1, . . . ,br) defines the optimization problem
sup
X∈Sn(R)
Tr[CX ] ,
subject to Tr[Fi X ]= bi for all i ∈ 1, . . . , r,
X º 0,
(2.7.1)
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which we refer to as a semidefinite program (SDP) in its primal form.
By the principle of Lagrangian duality [82] there exists a secondary optimization prob-
lem, known as the dual problem, which offers an alternate perspective on the optimization.
It may be derived by considering the Lagrangian of (2.7.1)
L(X ,λ,Y )=Tr[CX ]+
∑
i
λi(bi−Tr[Fi X ])+Tr[XY ] (2.7.2)
where λ ∈ Rr and Y º 0 are dual variables. The primal problem is recovered from the
Lagrangian by considering the primal functional f (X ) := infλ,Y L(X ,λ,Y ). The constraints
imposed by the primal problem emerge from requiring that f (X ) is bounded. That is, for
X ∈Sn(R) we have
inf
Yº0
Tr[XY ] =
0 if X º 0−∞ otherwise (2.7.3)
and
inf
λi∈R
λi(bi−Tr[Fi X ]) =
0 if Tr[Fi X ]= bi−∞ otherwise. (2.7.4)
Therefore, by enforcing that supX∈Sn(R) f (X ) is bounded from below we recover precisely
the primal problem.
We derive the dual problem by switching the order with which we take the supremum
and infimum of the Lagrangian. By the linearity of the trace, we may rearrange the
Lagrangian
L(X ,λ,Y )=∑
i
λibi+Tr
[
(C−∑
i
λiFi+Y )X
]
,
and we define the dual functional g(λ,Y ) := supX L(X ,λ,Y ). As before, the constraints of
the problem emerge from the requirement that the functional is bounded. This is precisely
when C−∑iλiFi+Y = 0 and as we are already imposing Y º 0, this is equivalent to the
condition C−∑iλiFi ¹ 0 with Y =∑iλiFi −C now implicit. Subject to these conditions
holding, the Lagrangian dual functional becomes g(λ)=∑iλibi and we arrive at the dual
formulation of our problem.
Definition 2.10 (Dual SDP). Let C,F1, . . . ,Fr ∈Sn(R) and b1, . . . ,br ∈R. The collection
(C,F1, . . . ,Fr,b1, . . . ,br) defines the optimization problem
inf
λ∈Rm
λ ·b
subject to C−∑
i
λiFi ¹ 0
(2.7.5)
which we refer to as a semidefinite program (SDP) in its dual form.
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Remark 2.11. We refer to a matrix X ′ ∈Sn(R) or a vector λ′ ∈ Rm as feasible points of
the primal and dual SDPs respectively, if they satisfy the constraints imposed by the
respective optimization problems. Additionally, any such points that satisfy the respective
strict versions of the inequality constraints are referred to as strictly feasible points. If the
set of feasible points of an optimization problem is empty, then we refer to that problem as
infeasible and consider its value to be −∞ if the problem’s objective is a supremum and ∞
if it is an infimum.
We shall now review several properties of the primal and dual formulation of SDPs.
• Weak duality: SDPs (and all optimization problems in general) satisfy a property
known as weak duality. That is, if p∗ and d∗ denote the optimal values of the primal
and dual problems, respectively. Then we have the ordering
p∗ ≤ d∗. (2.7.6)
This follows immediately from the construction of the primal and dual programs from
the Lagrangian, together with the max-min inequality [82]: for any f :Rn×Rm →R
and any V ⊆Rn and W ⊆Rm we have
sup
v∈V
inf
w∈W
f (v,w)≤ inf
w∈W
sup
v∈V
f (v,w). (2.7.7)
• Strong duality: We say that the primal and dual formulations of the optimization
problem are strongly dual, whenever p∗ = d∗. Unlike linear programming, strong
duality may not always occur in feasible SDPs. However, there exist sufficient con-
ditions for strong duality to hold (more generally known as constraint qualification
conditions). One such condition is Slater’s condition [83], which states that if one of
the formulations is strictly feasible then the other achieves its optimum exactly and
the two formulations as a pair are strongly dual.
• Inequality constraints: Note that the primal and dual formulations do not con-
tain any linear inequality constraints. However, any inequality constraint can be
implemented using an equality constraint together with an augmentation of the
semidefinite constraint. That is, to implement the constraint Tr[F X ] ≤ b, we can
introduce an additional variable s ∈R into the problem, known as a slack variable.
We then rewrite the inequality as the equality Tr[F X ] = b− s together with s ≥ 0.
The constraint s≥ 0 can be implemented by modifying the semidefinite constraint
X º 0 to be X⊕ sº 0.19
19Depending on the algorithm used to solve the SDP, all equality constraints may be converted to two
inequality constraints, i.e. Tr[F X ]= b becomes Tr[F X ]≤ b and Tr[F X ]≥ b. The constraints imposed by the
program can then be viewed as one large semidefinite constraint. This conversion is used in the primal-dual
interior point method implemented by the sdpa solvers [84].
41
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES
• Dual functional as a bounding hyperplane: Let D(b) := {X ∈Sn(R) | Tr[Fi X ]=
bi, X º 0} be the set of feasible points for the primal problem (2.7.1) parametrized by
the vector b ∈Rr, let p∗(b)= supX∈D(b) Tr[CX ] denote the optimum primal value and
let λb be a feasible point in the dual program. Then define the function gb : c 7→λb ·c
for any c ∈Rr. Then, for any c ∈Rr we have
p∗(c)≤ gb(c). (2.7.8)
That is, a dual functional derived from any parametrization of the dual program20 can
be evaluated to give an upper bound on the optimal solution to a primal problem. To
see this, take the dual constraint for the program parametrized by b, i.e. C−∑iλiFi ¹
0, and for some X ∈D(c) apply the map M 7→Tr[MX ] for M ∈Sn(R). This implies,
Tr[CX ]≤
∑
i
λi ci
and (2.7.8) follows from taking the supremum over all X ∈D(c).
2.7.2 Semidefinite relaxations of quantum correlations
Given the ubiquity of positive semidefinite matrices within the field quantum information,
it comes with little to no surprise to find that SDPs have wide ranging applications in the
area [46]. In this thesis, we are interested in how SDPs can be used to approximate the
set of quantum correlations QAB|XY . This allows us to compute quantities such as the
device-independent guessing probability (2.6.1) without having to directly optimise over
Q. Interestingly, this particular application of semidefinite programming did not begin
with quantum information in mind. Rather, it started with the problem of optimizing
multivariate polynomials [85,86] and the techniques developed were later generalised to
the case of non-commutative multivariate polynomials [87]. The latter problem can then be
used to approximate the set of quantum correlations [40,41].
Recall that for a distribution p ∈PAB|XY to be quantum, there must exist a Hilbert
spaceH, a state ρ ∈S(H) and measurement operators {{Ea|x}a∈A}x∈X , {{Fb|y}b∈B}y∈Y ∈M(H)
such that p(a,b|x, y) = Tr[ρEa|x⊗Fb|y] for all (a,b, x, y) ∈ ABXY . The purpose of this
section is to define a collection of converging outer approximations Q(1) ⊇Q(2) ⊇ ·· · ⊇Q,
such that membership of Q(k) is equivalent to the existence of some positive semidefinite
matrix Γ(k), this hierarchy of necessary conditions is sometimes referred to as the NPA
hierarchy. Therefore, given an optimization problem we can replace membership of Q with
the computationally more appealing constraint, the existence of a positive semidefinite
matrix, to get a bound on the solution of the problem.
20The dual functional will however be trivial if the parametrization has an empty feasible set.
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As we place no dimension restriction onH,21 the Naimark and Stinespring dilation theo-
rems22 [88] tell us that without loss of generality we may restrict our considerations to that
of pure states and projective measurements. Let W (1) = {1}∪ {Ea|x}(a,x)∈AX ∪ {Fb|y}(b,y)∈BY .
We refer to a product of elements of W (1) as a word, e.g. w = Ea|xFb|yEa′|x is a word.
Due to algebraic constraints on the operators; e.g. impotency E2a|x =Ea|x, commutativity
Ea|xFb|y = Fb|yEa|x and orthogonality Ea|xEa′|x = 0, many words will be equivalent. For-
mally, we can define an equivalence relation ∼ where w1 ∼ w2 if they correspond to the
same operator. We define the length of a word w, denoted |w|, to be the shortest product of
elements in the equivalence class [w]. For example, |1Ea|xFb|yEa|xFb|y| = |Ea|xFb|y| = 2.
Now we define the sets W (k) for k ∈N to be all words, up to equivalences, of length no
greater that k. For example, one possible identification of W (2) is
W (2) =W (1)∪{Ea|xEa′|x′}a,a′∈A,x,x′∈X :x 6=x′∪{Fb|yFb′|y′}b,b′∈B,y,y′∈Y :y6=y′∪{Ea|xFb|y}(a,b,x,y)∈ABXY .
We refer to W (k) as the monomial set of level k. Now given W (k) we define the certificate of
level k to be the matrix Γ(k) indexed by elements of W (k) such that
Γ(k)v,w =Tr
[
ρv†w
]
, (2.7.9)
for each v,w ∈W (k) and some ρ ∈S(H). Then we say a distribution p ∈P has a certificate
of level k, denoted by p ∈Q(k), if there exists a Γ(k) with entries that are consistent with p,
i.e. the following all hold
Γ(k)
1,Ea|x
= p(a|x), (2.7.10)
Γ(k)
1,Fb|y
= p(b|y), (2.7.11)
Γ(k)Ea|x,Fb|y
= p(a,b|x, y). (2.7.12)
Remark 2.12. As each level of the hierarchy adds additional constraints to the problem
we have the inclusion chain Q(1) ⊇Q(2) ⊇ . . . . Moreover, the hierarchy provides necessary
and sufficient conditions for a behaviour to be quantum: p ∈Q iff p ∈Q(k) for all k ∈N.
The conic program (2.6.1) now becomes a semidefinite program which can be solved in
an efficient manner, at the expense of possibly not obtaining the same optimum value. The
corresponding relaxed problem is
p(k)guess(ω) := sup
{p˜e}e
∑
ab
p˜eab (a,b|x˜, y˜)
subj. to
∑
e
∑
abxy
µ(x, y)pe(a,b|x, y)δV (a,b,x,y),c =ω(c) ∀c ∈G
p˜e ∈ Q˜(k) ∀ e .
(2.7.13)
21The NPA hierarchy also applies to infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces.
22Both dilation theorems ascertain the existence of an isometry V :H→H′, ‘dilating the Hilbert space’,
such that the objects of interest under this mapping take an arguably simpler form. In particular, Naimark’s
theorem dilates POVMs to projective measurements and Stinespring’s theorem dilates completely positive
maps to unitary maps.
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where we have now explicitly parametrized the program by some expected frequency
distribution ω ∈QG . Since the NPA hierarchy forms a sequence of outer approximations to
the set of quantum correlations,Q1 ⊇Q2 ⊇ ·· · ⊇Q, the relaxed guessing probability provides
an upper bound on the true guessing probability, i.e., pguess(ω) ≤ p(k)guess(ω). Combined
with (2.2.12), one can use the relaxed programs to compute valid device-independent lower
bounds on Hmin. We denote a feasible point of the dual of (2.7.13), when parametrized by
ω, by λω. Note that for our later analysis we only need λω to be a feasible point of the dual
program, we do not require it to be optimal.23 Any feasible point allows us to construct
functions that upper bound the guessing probability (cf. (2.7.8)) and in turn lower bound
the min-entropy.
23The optimal point may not even be achievable unless the program is strongly dual.
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A FRAMEWORK FOR CONSTRUCTING RANDOMNESS EXPANSION
PROTOCOLS
This chapter presents a method for constructing quantum-secure randomness ex-pansion protocols. We begin by introducing the task of randomness expansion andthe generic spot-checking protocol. In Sec. 3.2 we present a numerical construction
of min-tradeoff functions and show how this can be applied to the spot-checking protocol
to generate the relevant security statements. We conclude the chapter in Sec. 3.3 with an
analysis of the cost of seeding the protocol.
3.1 Randomness expansion
A device-independent randomness expansion protocol is a procedure by which one attempts
to use a private and uniform seed to produce a longer private and uniform output, through
repeated interactions with some untrusted devices. We begin by introducing the generic
structure of the spot-checking protocol which we will build upon to produce our quantum
randomness expansion (QRE) protocol (see Fig. 3.3).
3.1.1 The spot-checking protocol
Randomness expansion consists of three main subprocedures: accumulation, evaluation and
extraction. During the accumulation phase, agents interact with their untrusted devices in
an attempt to generate entropy. Next, the evaluation phase acts as the quality control step
in the protocol. During evaluation the statistics produced during the accumulation step are
checked against some preselected nonlocality test. If the untrusted devices fail to display
a sufficient level of nonlocality then the protocol is abandoned. However, if the protocol
does not abort then the agents can use the EAT to place a probabilistic lower bound on the
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private randomness produced during the accumulation phase. Finally, with a lower bound
on the total entropy produced the agents can apply a randomness extractor to compress
the long, partially random output string into a shorter string of almost uniformly random
bits. Let us now elaborate on these three subprocedures.
Accumulation
During the accumulation step, the agents interact with their respective devices in
order to generate randomness. Before beginning this subprocedure the agents place their
untrusted devices in secure laboratories subject to the conditions detailed in Sec. 2.6. Then,
a nonlocality test G = (µ,V ) is chosen, which will be used to evaluate the quality of the
devices in the next step.
The accumulation procedure consists of n ∈N separate interactions with the untrusted
devices. We refer to a single interaction with the devices as a round. A round consists of
the agents selecting and supplying inputs to the devices, receiving outputs and recording
this data. During the ith round, a random variable Ti ∼Bernoulli(γ) is sampled, for some
fixed γ ∈ (0,1), indicating whether the round will be a generation round or a test round.
With probability 1−γ we have Ti = 0 and the round is a generation round. During a
generation round, the agents supply their respective devices with the fixed generation
inputs (x˜, y˜) ∈ XY , recording X iYi = (x˜, y˜). They record the outputs they receive from
their devices as A i and Bi respectively and they record the round’s score as Ci =⊥. With
probability γ, Ti = 1 and the round is a test round. During a test round, inputs X iYi are
sampled according to the distribution specified by the nonlocal game. The sampled inputs
are fed to their respective devices and the outputs received are recorded as A iBi. The
score is computed and recorded as Ci =V (A i,Bi, X i,Yi). The transcript for round i is the
tuple (A i,Bi, X i,Yi,Ti,Ci). After n rounds, the complete transcript for the accumulation
procedure is (An1 ,B
n
1 , X
n
1 ,Y
n
1 ,T
n
1 ,C
n
1 ).
Remark 3.1. Let us expand on several aspects of the accumulation procedure.
1. The generation inputs should be chosen in order to maximize the randomness gener-
ated, e.g. in the extended CHSH game (cf. Fig. 2.2) one should choose (x˜, y˜)= (1,2).
2. By choosing the rounds randomly according to a distribution heavily favouring
generation rounds, we are able to reduce the size of the seed whilst sufficiently
constraining the device’s behaviour, guaranteeing the presence of randomness within
the outcomes (except with some small probability). This allows us to maximize our
net gain in entropy.
3. From the description of the accumulation procedure above, it may see that the
spot checking protocol is not compatible with a loophole free test of nonlocality. As
information about the round type propagates to the agents, which influences their
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choice of input, it is entirely possible that this information could also propagate to the
devices and influence their behaviour. This would render moot any inference about the
devices’ behaviour during generation rounds from observations of its behaviour during
test rounds. This can be remedied by either introducing the additional assumption
that the devices are shielded from this information (see Sec. 2.6) or by selecting the
round types in a manner that avoids this loophole (see the supplementary material
of [89]).
Evaluation
The accumulation step sees the agents produce a transcript (An1 ,B
n
1 , X
n
1 ,Y
n
1 ,T
n
1 ,C
n
1 ).
Next, they look to determine the quality of this transcript and, in turn, certify a lower
bound on the total entropy produced, H²min(A
n
1 B
n
1 |X n1 Y n1 E). To this end, the agents compute
their empirical frequency distribution
FCn1 (c)=
1
n
n∑
i=1
δc,Ci . (3.1.1)
Prior to the accumulation step, the agents fix some frequency distribution ω that they
expect (or hope) the devices to behave like in each round. Should the devices actually behave
in an i.i.d. manner according to ω, then concentration bounds tell us that the empirical
frequency distribution FCn1 should be close to this. With this in mind, we define the event
that the protocol does not abort by
Ω= {Cn1 | γ(ω(G)−δ)<FCn1 (G)< γ(ω(G)+δ)}, (3.1.2)
where δ ∈ (0,1)|G| is a vector of confidence interval widths satisfying 0<δ<ω(G) with all
vector inequalities being interpreted as element-wise constraints.
If the agents have not aborted the protocol, then they may apply the EAT conditioned on
the eventΩ to lower bound the total smooth min-entropy produced during the accumulation
phase. In order to do this the agents require a min-tradeoff function for their accumulation
procedure. A method by which one can construct these min-tradeoff functions is the focus
of Sec. 3.2.1.
Remark 3.2.
1. In order to fix a sensible expected frequency distribution prior to accumulation, the
agents must have some knowledge about the expected behaviour of the devices. In
practice, this could be communicated by the manufacturer of the devices. Note that
a malicious manufacturer does not gain anything by providing the agents with an
inaccurate behaviour. Such an action would only lead to a larger probability of abort.1
1And, in turn, one would expect a large reduction in sales.
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2. The success event Ω does not constrain the value of FCn1 (⊥). This is because the
value of FCn1 (⊥) is not indicative of the devices’ nonlocal behaviour. Moreover, as the
sampling of the test rounds is a trusted i.i.d. procedure the value FCn1 (⊥) takes should,
except with some small probability, be within a small region centred about (1−γ).
3. The success event Ω consists of upper and lower bounds on each element of the
frequency distribution. If the certifiable entropy is monotonic with respect to an
element of the frequency distribution then we only require a one sided bound.2 For
example, a higher score in the CHSH game allows us to certify more entropy and so
it is sufficient to assume just a lower bound (see (4.3.11)).
Extraction
If the protocol does not abort during the evaluation stage, then the agents will have
produced a string of bits An1 B
n
1 that they are confident has at least k bits of smooth min-
entropy, i.e. except with some small probability we have H²smin(A
n
1 B
n
1 |X n1 Y n1 E) > k. They
are now free to apply a quantum-secure randomness extractor (see Sec. 2.4) to An1 B
n
1 to
produce approximately k, close to uniformly random bits.
Remark 3.3. There is a question of whether the quantity we are actually interested in
is H²smin(A
n
1 B
n
1 |X n1 Y n1 E), rather than H²smin(An1 Bn1 |E) or H
²s
min(A
n
1 B
n
1 X
n
1 Y
n
1 |E). In common
key-distribution protocols (such as BB84), the first of these is the only reasonable choice
because the information X n1 Y
n
1 is communicated between the two parties over an insecure
channel and hence could become known by Eve. For randomness expansion, this is no longer
the case: this communication can all be kept secure within a single laboratory. Whether
the alternative quantities can be used then depends on where the seed randomness comes
from. If a trusted beacon is used then the first case is needed. If the seed randomness
can be kept secure until such time that the random numbers need no longer be kept
random then the second quantity could be used3. If it is also desirable to extract as much
randomness as possible, then the third quantity could be used instead. However, due to
the spot-checking structure of the protocols, the amount of seed required for the entropy
accumulation procedure is small enough that its reuse will not be of practical significance
(see the discussion in Sec. 3.3).
2In fact, as min-tradeoff functions are required to be affine, they will necessarily be monotonic in each
element of the empirical frequency distribution. Therefore, after selecting a min-tradeoff function one could
modify Ω to only include one sided bounds. In turn, one could gain approximately a factor of two in the
completeness error. In spite of this we presentΩ in manner seen above as it is conceptually clearer and requires
no additional knowledge of the min-tradeoff function structure.
3This is a reasonable requirement, because there are other strings that have to be kept secure in the same
way, e.g., the raw string An1 .
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3.1.2 Security definitions
The security definitions for our randomness expansion protocols are based on the distin-
guishability paradigm introduced in [90, 91] for classical cryptography. The idea is that
one can define an ideal system that performs our cryptographic task securely. Then, we
say a real system is secure if it is, except with some small probability, indistinguishable
from the ideal system. This notion of security allows for the composition of secure protocols,
without compromising the security of the overall procedure. To make this more precise,
consider a hypothetical device that outputs a string Z that is uniform and uncorrelated
with any information held by an eavesdropper. In other words, it outputs τm⊗ρE, where
τm is the maximally mixed state on m qubits. The ideal protocol is defined as the protocol
that involves first doing the real protocol, then, in the case of no abort, replacing the output
with a string of the same length taken from the hypothetical device. The protocol is then
said to be εsound-secure if, when the user either implements the real or ideal protocol with
probability 12 , the maximum probability that a distinguisher can guess which is being
implemented is at most 1+εsound2 . If εsound is small, then the real and ideal protocols are vir-
tually indistinguishable. For an overview of composable security, with a focus on quantum
cryptography, we refer the reader to [92].
The soundness error alone does not capture all of the features of a secure protocol.
For example, one can construct a vacuously secure randomness expansion protocol by
demanding that during the evaluation step the protocol always aborts. In this case, the real
and ideal protocols are indistinguishable as they will both only ever abort. However, this
is clearly not a very useful procedure. To avoid these scenarios we have a second security
parameter, the completeness error, which is the probability that an ideal implementation of
the protocol leads to an abort. Combining soundness and completeness we arrive at the
security definition for our protocol.
Definition 3.1. Let R be a randomness expansion protocol producing an output Z and
let Ω be the event that the protocol does not abort. Then, we say R is an (εsound,εcomp)-
randomness expansion protocol if it satisfies the following two conditions.
1. Soundness:
1
2
P [Ω] · ‖ρZE−τm⊗ρE‖1 ≤ εsound, (3.1.3)
where E is an arbitrary quantum register (which could have been entangled with the
devices used at the start of the protocol), m is the length of the output string Z and
τm is the maximally mixed state on a system of dimension 2m.
2. Completeness: There exists a set of quantum states and measurements such that if
they are used to implement protocol R then
P [Ω]≥ 1−εcomp. (3.1.4)
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Remark 3.4. Although we use a composable security definition to ensure that any ran-
domness output by the protocol can be used in any scenario, importantly, this may not
apply if the devices used in the protocol are subsequently reused [93]. Thus, after the
protocol the devices should be kept shielded and not reused until the randomness generated
no longer needs to be kept secure. How to best resolve this remains an open problem:
the Supplemental Material of [93] presents ideas for modifications to the protocol (and
modifications to the notion of composability) that may circumvent such problems.
3.2 A template randomness expansion protocol
In this section we introduce a method for constructing randomness expansion protocols that
can be tailored to devices with different specifications. Our template protocol, Protocol QRE
(see Fig. 3.3), follows the general spot-checking structure introduced above and is proven to
be secure when used with any nonlocal game G. We begin by showing how min-tradeoff
functions can be constructed numerically and then apply this to the task of randomness
expansion.
3.2.1 Numerical constructions of min-tradeoff functions
We now present a constructible family of min-tradeoff functions for a general instance
of Protocol QRE. The construction is based on the following idea. As noted in Sec. 2.6.1
one can numerically calculate a lower bound on the min-entropy of a system based on its
observed statistics. Pairing this with the relation, Hmin(X |E) ≤ H(X |E), we have access
to numerical bounds on the von Neumann entropy. In particular, we can extract a linear
functional from the dual of program (2.7.13), in order to construct a min-tradeoff function
for the protocol.4 However, in order to capture the spot-checking structure of the protocol,
we must extend the domain of our function to include the no-test symbol ⊥. We perform
this extension by following the procedure detailed in [25].
As the rounds are split into testing and generation rounds, we may decompose the
EAT-channel for the ith round as Ni = γN testi + (1−γ)N geni , where N testi is the channel
that is applied if the round is a test round and N geni if the round is a generation round.
Importantly, this splitting separates the no-test symbol ⊥ from the nonlocal game scores.
That is, if N testi is applied then P [Ci =⊥]= 0 whereas if N geni is applied then P [Ci =⊥]= 1.
The following lemma, Lemma 5.5 in [25], explains how one can extend the domain of our
entropy bounding functions to capture the spot-checking structure of our protocols.
4In fact, by relaxing the dual program to some level of the NPA hierarchy, the single round bound is
valid against super-quantum adversaries. However, the security of the full protocol may not extend to such
adversaries: to show that we would need to generalise the EAT and the extractor.
50
3.2. A TEMPLATE RANDOMNESS EXPANSION PROTOCOL
Lemma 3.1 (Min-tradeoff extension [25] ). Let g :PG→R be an affine function satisfying
g(p)≤ inf
σRi−1R′ :N testi (σ)Ci (G)=τp
H(A iBi|X iYiR′)Ni(σ) (3.2.1)
for all p ∈QG . Then, the function f :PG∪{⊥} →R, defined by its action on trivial distributions
f (δc)=Max[g]+ g(δc)−Max[g]
γ
, ∀c ∈G,
f (δ⊥)=Max[g],
is a min-tradeoff function for the EAT-channels {Ni}i. Furthermore, f satisfies the following
properties:
Max[ f ]=Max[g],
MinΣ[ f ]≥Min[g],
VarΣ[ f ]≤ (Max[g]−Min[g])
2
γ
.
We now have all the relevant machinery to state our numerical construction of min-
tradeoff functions. The following lemma details precisely how one can use the relaxed
dual of the guessing probability program in order to construct a min-tradeoff function for
Protocol QRE.
Lemma 3.2 (Min-tradeoff construction). Let G be a nonlocal game and k ∈ N. For each
ν ∈ Q(k)G , let λν be a feasible point of the dual of Prog. (2.7.13) when parameterized by
ν and computed at the kth relaxation level. Furthermore, let λmax = maxc∈G λν(c) and
λmin =minc∈G λν(c). Then, for any set of EAT channels {Ni}ni=1 implementing an instance
of Protocol QRE with the nonlocal game G, the set of functionals Fmin(G)=
{
fν(·) |ν ∈Q(k)G
}
forms a family of min-tradeoff functions, where fν :PC→R are defined by
fν(δc) := (1−γ)
(
Aν−Bνλν(c)− (1−γ)λmin
γ
)
for c ∈G (3.2.2)
and
fν(⊥) := (1−γ) (Aν−Bνλmin) ,
(3.2.3)
where Aν = 1ln2 − log(λν ·ν) and Bν = 1λν·ν ln2 are constants defined by the solution to the
dual program.
Moreover, these min-tradeoff functions satisfy the following relations.
• Maximum:
Max[ fν]= (1−γ)(Aν−Bνλmin) (3.2.4)
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• Σ-Minimum:
MinΣ[ fν]≥ (1−γ)(Aν−Bνλmax) (3.2.5)
• Σ-Variance:
VarΣ[ fν]≤
(1−γ)2B2ν(λmax−λmin)2
γ
(3.2.6)
Proof. Consider the entropy bounding property (3.2.1) but with C restricted to the scores of
G, i.e., we have an affine function gν :PG→R such that
gν(q)≤ inf
σRi−1R′ :N testi (σ)Ci (G)=τq
H(A iBi|X iYiR′)Ni(σ),
for all q ∈QG .
As conditioning on additional side information will not increase the von Neumann
entropy,5 we may condition on whether or not the round was a test round,
H(A iBi|X iYiR′)Ni(σ) ≥H(A iBi|X iYiTiR′)Ni(σ)
= γH(A iBi|X iYi,Ti = 1,R′)Ni(σ)+ (1−γ)H(A iBi|X iYi,Ti = 0,R′)Ni(σ)
> (1−γ)H(A iBi|X i = x˜,Yi = y˜,Ti = 0,R′)Ni(σ)
where in the final line we have used the fact that the inputs are fixed for generation rounds.
As the min-entropy lower bounds the von Neumann entropy, we arrive at the bound
H(A iBi|X iYiR′)Ni(σ) > (1−γ)Hmin(A iBi|X i = x˜,Yi = y˜,Ti = 0,R′)Ni(σ).
Using the relaxed guessing probability program and its dual, we can lower bound the
right-hand side. Specifically, for a single generation round
Hmin(AB|X = x˜,Y = y˜,T = 0,R′)=− log(pguess(q))
≥− log(λ(k)ν ·q),
holds for all k ∈N, any ν ∈Q(k)G and any quantum system realising the expected statistics
q ∈QG . In the final line we used the monotonicity of the logarithm together with the fact
that a solution to the relaxed dual program, for any parameterization ν ∈Q(k)G , provides
a linear function q 7→λν ·q that is everywhere on Q(k)G greater than pguess. Note that this
bound is independent of the quantum state for which the entropy is evaluated and therefore
automatically bounds the infimum. Dropping the (k) for notational ease, we may recover
the desired affine property by taking a first order expansion about the point ν,
−(1−γ) log(λν ·ν)− (1−γ)
∑
c∈G
λν(c)
λν ·ν ln2
(q(c)−ν(c)).
5This is a consequence of the strong subadditivity property of the von Neumann entropy [46]. For any
ρ ∈S(ABC), we have
H(ABC)+H(B)≤H(AB)+H(BC).
After rearranging this expression we find that H(A|BC)≤H(A|B).
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Introducing, the constants Aν = 1ln2 − log(λν ·ν) and Bν = 1λν·ν ln2 we may rewrite this
expansion as the function
gν(q) := (1−γ)(Aν−Bνλν ·q),
which satisfies
gν(q)≤ inf
σRi−1R′ :N testi (σ)Ci (G)=τq
H(A iBi|X iYiR′)Ni(σ),
for all q ∈QG . The statement then follows from applying Lemma 3.1 to gν, noting Max[gν]=
(1−γ)(Aν−Bνλmin) and Min[gν]= (1−γ)(Aν−Bνλmax). 
Example 3.1. Taking the nonlocal game GCHSH introduced in Example 2.4, we can use
the above lemma to construct a min-tradeoff function. Fixing the probability of testing,
γ = 5×10−3, we consider a device which behaves (during a test round) according to the
expected frequency distribution ω= (ωalign,ωCHSH,1−ωalign−ωCHSH). In Fig. 3.1, we plot
the certifiable min-entropy of a single generation round for a range of ω. We see that as the
scores approach ω= 12
(
1, 2+
p
2
4 ,
2−p2
4
)
, we are able to certify almost6 two bits of randomness
using GCHSH.
3.2.2 Application to the spot-checking protocol
After fixing the parameters of the protocol and constructing a min-tradeoff function fmin,
the user proceeds with the remaining steps of Protocol QRE: accumulation, evaluation
and extraction. Recall that if the protocol does not abort, then with high probability the
generated string An1 B
n
1 should contain at least some computable quantity of smooth min-
entropy. The following lemma applies the EAT to deduce a lower bound on the amount of
entropy produced by the devices.
Lemma 3.3 (Accumulated entropy). Let the randomness expansion procedure and all of its
parameters be as defined in Fig. 3.3. Furthermore, let Ω be the event that the protocol does
not abort (cf. (3.1.2)) and let ρ|Ω be the final state of the system conditioned on Ω. Then, for
any β, ²s, ²EAT ∈ (0,1) and any choice of min-tradeoff function fν ∈Fmin, either Protocol QRE
aborts with probability greater than 1−²EAT or
H²smin(A
n
1 B
n
1 |X n1 Y n1 E)ρ|Ω > (1−γ)n
(
Aν−Bνλν · (ωG −δ±)
)−n(²V +²K )−²Ω, (3.2.7)
where
²V := β ln22
(
log
(
2|AB|2+1)+
√
(1−γ)2B2ν(λmax−λmin)2
γ
+2
)2
, (3.2.8)
²K := β
2
6(1−β)3 ln2 2
β(log |AB|+(1−γ)Bν(λmax−λmin)) ln3
(
2log |AB|+(1−γ)Bν(λmax−λmin)+ e2
)
, (3.2.9)
6Due to the infrequent testing we are actually only able to certify a maximum of 2·(1−γ) bits per interaction.
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Figure 3.1: A plot of a lower bound on the certifiable min-entropy produced during a single
round of the protocol. This lower bound was calculated using Prog. 2.7.13 relaxed to the
second level of the NPA hierarchy. In addition, we plot a min-tradeoff function fν evaluated
for distributions of the form p= (γω,1−γ) for ω ∈QG , i.e. expected frequency distributions
over G∪ {⊥} that are compatible with the spot-checking structure of the rounds. Since fν
is the tangent plane to the surface at the point ν it forms an affine lower bound on the
min-entropy of any quantum distribution compatible with the protocol, i.e. any q ∈QG such
that Σq 6= ;.
²Ω :=
1
β
(1−2log(²EAT ²s)) (3.2.10)
and δ± is the vector with components δi ·sgn(−λi).
Proof. Let {Ni}i∈[n] be the set of channels implementing the entropy accumulation sub-
procedure of Protocol QRE. Comparing this procedure with the definition of the EAT chan-
nels Def. 2.5, we have Ni : S(Ri−1)→ S(A iBi X iYiTiCiRi) with A i,Bi, X i,Yi,Ti,Ci finite
dimensional classical systems, Ri an arbitrary quantum system and the score Ci is a deter-
ministic function of the values of the other classical systems. Furthermore, the inputs to the
protocol for the ith round, (X i,Yi,Ti), are chosen independently of all other systems in the
protocol and so the conditional independence constraints I(A i−11 B
i−1
1 : X iYi|X i−11 Y i−11 E)= 0
hold trivially. The conditions necessary for {Ni}i∈[n] to be EAT-channels are satisfied and
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by Lemma 3.2 fν is a min-tradeoff function for these channels. We now satisfy all of the
prerequisites required to use the EAT.
Consider the pass probability of the protocol, P [Ω]. There are two possibilities: either,
P [Ω]< ²EAT in which case the protocol will abort with probability greater than 1−²EAT, or
²EAT ≤P [Ω]. In the latter case we can replace the unknown P [Ω] in (2.3.15) with ²EAT as
this can only increase the error term ²Ω. The EAT then asserts that
H²smin(A
n
1 B
n
1 |X n1 Y n1 E)ρ|Ω > n infCn1∈Ω
fν(FCn1 )−n(²V +²K )−²Ω,
for any choice of min-tradeoff function fν ∈Fmin.
As the min-tradeoff functions are affine, a lower bound on the infimum over region of
possible scores specified by the success event,
Ω= {Cn1 | γ(ωG −δ)<FCn1 (G)< γ(ωG +δ)},
can be readily computed. In particular, taking p = (γ(ωG −δ±),1− γ) we have fν(p) ≤
infCn1∈Ω fν(FCn1 ). Note that p may not correspond to a frequency distribution that could
have resulted from a successful run of the protocol – it may not even be a probability
distribution. However, it is sufficient for our purposes as an explicit lower bound on the
infimum. Furthermore, noting that fν(p)= gν(ωG −δ±), this lower bound may be written
as
fν(p)= (1−γ)
(
Aν−Bνλν · (ωG −δ±)
)
.
Inserting the min-tradeoff function properties: (3.2.4), (3.2.5) and (3.2.6); into the the EAT’s
error terms we get the explicit form of the quantities ²V , ²K and ²Ω as seen above. 
If the protocol does not abort during the accumulation procedure, the user may proceed
by applying a quantum-proof strong extractor to the concatenated output string An1 B
n
1 re-
sulting in a close to uniform bit-string of length approximately (1−γ)n (Aν−Bνλν · (ωG −δ±))−
n(²V +²K )−²Ω.
Example 3.2. Continuing from Ex. 3.1, we look at the bound on the accumulated entropy
specified by (3.2.7) for a range of choices of fν ∈Fmin. We consider a quantum implementa-
tion with an expected frequency distribution ωG = (0.49,0.4225,0.0875), see the indicated
point in Fig. 3.1. In Fig. 3.2 we see that our choice of min-tradeoff function can have a
large impact on the quantity of entropy we are able to certify. The rough appearance of
the EAT-rate surface is an artefact of obtaining local optima when we optimize over β.
However, the plot gives some reassuring numerical evidence that, for the case of GCHSH,
the certifiable randomness is continuous and concave in the family parameter ν.
The min-tradeoff function, fωG , certifies just under 0.939 bits per round. By applying
a gradient-ascent algorithm we were able to improve this to 0.946 bits per round. In an
attempt to avoid getting stuck within local optima we applied the algorithm several
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Figure 3.2: A plot of the randomness certification rate as we vary the min-tradeoff function.
At each point ν we evaluate the lower bound on H²smin(A
n
1 B
n
1 |X n1 Y n1 E)/n as specified by
(3.2.7) for the corresponding choice of min-tradeoff function fν, numerically optimizing the
parameter β each time. The rough appearance of the surface results from finding local
optima in the β optimization. For reference, we include a plot of the asymptotic min-entropy
rate, i.e., the bound as n→∞, γ→ 0 and δ→ 0. The protocol parameters used during the
calculations are: n= 1010, γ= 5×10−3, δCHSH = δalign = 10−3 and ²s = ²EAT = 10−8.
times, starting subsequent iterations at randomly chosen points close to the current
optimum. The optimization led to an improved choice of min-tradeoff function fν∗ , where
ν∗ = (0.491,0.421,0.088).
3.2.3 Security of Protocol QRE
We refer to the pair of untrusted devices DAB as honest if during each interaction, the
underlying quantum state shared amongst the devices and the measurements performed
in response to inputs remain the same (i.e., the devices behave as the user expects). The
following lemma provides a bound on the probability that an honest implementation of
Protocol QRE aborts.
Lemma 3.4 (Completeness of Protocol QRE). Let Protocol QRE and all of its parameters be
as defined in Fig. 3.3. Then, the probability that an honest implementation of Protocol QRE
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Protocol QRE
Parameters and notation:
DAB – a collection of two untrusted devices with inputs X , Y and outputs A, B
G = (µ,V ) – a nonlocal game compatible with DAB
ωG ∈QG – an expected frequency distribution for G
δ – vector of confidence interval widths (satisfying 0≤ δk ≤ωk for all k ∈ [|G|])
n ∈N – number of rounds
γ ∈ (0,1) – probability of a test round
(x˜, y˜) – distinguished inputs for generation rounds
fmin – min-tradeoff function
²ext > 0 – extractor error
²s ∈ (0,1) – smoothing parameter
²EAT ∈ (0,1) – entropy accumulation error
Rext – quantum-proof (k,²ext+2²s)-strong extractor
`ext – entropy loss induced by Rext
Procedure:
1: Set i = 1.
2: While i ≤ n:
Choose Ti = 0 with probability 1−γ and otherwise T1 = 1.
If Ti = 0:
Gen: Input (x˜, y˜) into the respective devices, recording the inputs X iYi and outputs
A iBi. Set Ci =⊥ and i = i+1.
Else:
Test: Play a single round of G on DAB using inputs sampled from µ, recording the
inputs X iYi and outputs A iBi. Set Ci =V (A iBi X iYi) and i = i+1.
3: Compute the empirical frequency distribution FCn1 .
If γ(ωG −δ)<FCn1 (G)< γ(ωG +δ):
Ext: Apply a strong quantum-proof randomness extractor Rext to the output string An1 B
n
1
producing fmin(ωG −δ±)−`ext bits (²ext+2εs)-close to uniformly distributed.
Else:
Abort: Abort the protocol.
Figure 3.3: Template quantum-secure randomness expansion protocol
aborts is no greater than εcomp where
εcomp = 2
|G|∑
k=1
e−
γδ2k
3ωk
n. (3.2.11)
Proof. During the parameter estimation step of Protocol QRE, the protocol aborts if the
observed frequency distribution FCn1 fails to satisfy
γ(ωG −δ)< FCn1 (G)< γ(ωG +δ).
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Writing FCn1 (G) = (rk)
|G|
k=1, ωG = (ωk)
|G|
k=1 and δ = (δk)
|G|
k=1, the probability that an honest
implementation of the protocol aborts can be written as
P
[
Ωc
]=P[ |G|⋃
k=1
{∣∣rk−γωk∣∣≥ γδk}
]
≤
|G|∑
k=1
P
[∣∣rk−γωk∣∣≥ γδk] .
Restricting ourselves to a single element rk of FCn1 (G), we can model its final value as
the binomially distributed random variable rk ∼ 1n Bin
(
n,γωk
)
. As a consequence of the
Chernoff bound (see Corollary 2.1) and δk ≤ωk, we have
P
[∣∣rk−γωk∣∣≥ γδk]≤ 2e− γδ2k n3ωk .
Applying this bound to each element of the sum individually, we arrive at (3.2.11). 
Remark 3.5. The completeness error in the above lemma only considers the possibility of
the protocol aborting during the parameter estimation stage. However, if the initial random
seed is a limited resource then this may pose an additional restriction on the protocol. In
Lemma 3.7 we analyse the probability of failure of a specific algorithm for sampling the
inputs of Protocol QRE. If required, the probability of failure for that algorithm could be
incorporated into the completeness error.
Lemma 3.5 (Soundness of Protocol QRE). The soundness error of Protocol QRE is
εsound =max(²ext+2²s,²EAT) .
Proof. Recall from (3.1.3) that the soundness error is an upper bound on 12P [Ω] · ‖ρZE −
τm⊗ρE‖1. In the case P [Ω]≤ ²EAT, we have 12P [Ω] · ‖ρZE−τm⊗ρE‖1 ≤ ²EAT.
In the case P [Ω]> ²EAT, Lemma 3.3 gives a bound on the accumulated entropy. Com-
bining this with the definition of a quantum-proof strong extractor (Def. 2.7) and noting
that the norm is non-increasing under partial trace (tracing out the extractor’s seed) we
obtain 12P [Ω] · ‖ρZE−τm⊗ρE‖1 ≤ ²ext+2²s, from which the claim follows. 
Remark 3.6. By choosing parameters such that ²EAT ≤ ²ext+2²s we can take the soundness
error to be ²ext+2²s.
Combining all of the previous results we arrive at the full security statement concerning
Protocol QRE.
Theorem 3.1 (Security of Protocol QRE). Protocol QRE is an (εcomp,εsound)-secure random-
ness expansion protocol producing
((1−γ) (Aν−Bνλν · (ω−δ±))−²V −²K )n−²Ω−`ext (3.2.12)
random bits at least εsound-close to uniformly distributed, where εcomp, εsound are given as
in Lemma 3.4 (cf. Remark 3.5) and Lemma 3.5.
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Remark 3.7. The expected number of uniformly random bits required to execute Proto-
col QRE is d ≈ (γH(µ)+h(γ))n (cf. Lemma 3.7).
Example 3.3. In Ex. 3.1 (cf. Fig. 3.1) and Ex. 3.2 (cf. Fig. 3.2) we used the protocol
parameters: n = 1010, γ = 5×10−3, δ(c) = 10−3 for each c ∈ G and ²s = ²EAT = 10−8. The
resulting implementation of Protocol QRE, using the nonlocal game GCHSH with an expected
distribution over the scores ωG = (0.49,0.4225,0.0875), exhibits the following statistics.
Quantity Value
Total accumulated entropy before extraction (no abort) 9.46×109
Expected length of required seed before extraction 5.54×108
Expected net-gain in entropy (no abort) 8.91×109−`ext
Completeness error (εcomp) 8.77×10−8
3.3 Bookkeeping
Let us now investigate the amount of initial randomness required to run protocols within
the framework. This supply of random bits is necessary for selecting the devices’ inputs
and seeding the extractor. In the forthcoming analysis we focus our attention on the former
since the latter is dependent on the choice of extractor. Moreover, if one chooses to use
a strong extractor, then the seed acts in a catalytic manner and thus, in this sense, can
be regarded as free. Therefore, we restrict our considerations to the process of converting
a uniform private seed into the device inputs required for running Protocol QRE. We
begin by introducing an efficient algorithm for simulating the sampling of a target random
variable T by sampling another random variable S [94]. We then apply this algorithm to the
spot-checking protocol and use it to bound the size of the seed required to run Protocol QRE.
3.3.1 The interval algorithm
Let S and T be random variables taking values from their respective alphabets S and T .
The interval algorithm proposes a method by which we can use repeated samples of S to
simulate a sample of T.
The distributions of the random variables S and T both form a partition of the unit
interval: that is, to each outcome s ∈S (t ∈ T ) we associate a subinterval of length P [S = s]
(P [T = t]). Similarly, if we repeatedly sample S, i.e. sample the product distribution Sk
for some k ∈N, then this defines another, more fine-grained, partition of the unit interval.
To execute the interval algorithm we repeatedly sample S, recording the outcomes s =
(s1, s2, . . . ) until the interval corresponding to our sequence of outcomes is contained entirely
within one of the intervals defined by the distribution of the random variable T. Once this
termination criterion is met, the algorithm returns the label t ∈ T of the interval that our
sequence is entirely contained within.
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Intuitively, the algorithm can be seen to converge, since, after k samples of S, Sk defines
a fine-grained partition of the unit interval with |S|k subintervals, the largest of which has
size (maxs∈S P [S = s])k. Considering then the subinterval corresponding to an outcome t
of T, as k becomes large the subintervals of Sk contained entirely inside the subinterval
corresponding to t have a combined length that is close to P [T = t] with an error that
decreases exponentially in k. As this holds for all t ∈ T , for large enough k the algorithm
returns t with probability that is close to P [T = t] and thus the procedure provides a good
approximation for sampling T.
For simplicity we shall now restrict ourselves to the case where S corresponds to
sampling a uniformly random bit. The question remains as to how efficient this procedure
is in terms of the number of random bits required. Denoting the length of seed required for
the interval algorithm to terminate by N, we have, by Theorem 3 in [94],
E [N]≤H(T)+3. (3.3.1)
The sampling procedure defined by the interval algorithm does not bound the maximum
value that N can take (although the probability that the algorithm does not terminate
decreases exponentially in the number of samples). In order to produce large deviation
bounds on the number of bits required to execute our protocol, we place an upper limit
on the maximum seed length. We thus propose an adapted sampling procedure which we
call the rounded interval algorithm (RIA), which forcefully terminates if the seed length
reaches the upper bound of kmax bits. Should the RIA fail to terminate after kmax steps,
then the output sequence generated will correspond to the subinterval I(r)=
[
r
2kmax ,
r+1
2kmax
)
,
for some r ∈ {0,1, . . . ,2kmax −1}, that is not entirely contained within one of the subintervals
defined by T. If this occurs, we round down: selecting the interval I t for which r2kmax ∈ I t.
Remark 3.8. The rounding procedure bounds the maximum seed length as N ≤ kmax and
therefore, the inequality (3.3.1) also holds for the RIA.
The truncation of the interval algorithm, described in the RIA, does not significantly
hinder the convergence of the procedure as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 3.6. Let T be a random variable taking values in some alphabet T . Let T ′ be the
distribution sampled using the RIA with target distribution T. Then
∆(T,T ′)≤ |T |2−(kmax+1),
where kmax is the maximum number of input bits that can be used by the RIA.
Proof. Consider the partitions of the unit interval {I(t)}t∈T and {I ′(t)}t∈T corresponding to
the distributions pT and qT ′ of T and T ′ respectively. The intervals of T ′ take the form
I ′(t)=⋃
r
[
r
2kmax
,
r+1
2kmax
)
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where the (potentially empty) union is taken over all r ∈N0 such that r2−kmax ∈ I(t). The
intervals within the union are either contained fully within the corresponding outcome
interval of T, i.e.,
[
r
2kmax ,
r+1
2kmax
)
⊆ I(t), or they are included as a result of rounding. Thus we
may write
|I ′(t)| = |{r | r2−kmax ∈ I(t), r ∈N0}|2−kmax .
By a straightforward counting argument, there are at least
⌊|I(t)|2kmax⌋ such values of r,
and at most
⌈|I(t)|2kmax⌉. We hence have
|I(t)|2kmax −1≤ |I ′(t)|2kmax ≤ |I(t)|2kmax +1,
and therefore
|pT (t)− pT ′(t)| ≤ 2−kmax ,
holds for all t ∈ T . Applying this bound to each term within the ∆(T,T ′) sum completes the
proof. 
3.3.2 Input randomness for Protocol QRE
Following Protocol QRE, we look to use the RIA to sample the devices’ inputs for each
round. In adherence with the conditional independence constraints of Def. 2.5, the natural
procedure would be to sample at the beginning of each round. However, sampling many
inputs at once turns out to be much more efficient in terms of the length of seed required.
This can be seen by considering the bound (3.3.1) together with the property H(Tn)= nH(T):
by sampling the joint distribution, Tn, the expected saving is about 3n bits when compared
to repeating a single sample n times. This is significant as the bound on the entropy we
accumulate also grows linearly in n.
Fortunately, this joint sampling can be implemented while maintaining the conditional
independence assumption required for the EAT analysis. Within the assumptions of Pro-
tocol QRE we allow the honest parties access to a trusted classical computer, which also
contains some trusted data storage—we assume that the parties can record their output
strings without leakage. Thus, the honest parties may select the devices’ inputs prior to
the device interaction phase, store them securely within the classical computer and, at
the beginning of each round, feed the corresponding inputs to their devices. In such a
scenario we retain the conditional independence assumption specified in Def. 2.5. Due to
potential computational constraints we will not assume that all n rounds are sampled at
once. Instead, we split the n rounds into at most dn/me blocks of size m and apply the RIA
to sample the inputs of each block separately. For simplicity, we assume that n/m ∈N and
henceforth remove the ceiling function from the analysis.
Recall that for the ith round, the user first uses Ti to decide whether the round is a test
round, and, if so, they choose inputs according to the input distribution µ of their chosen
nonlocality test. Otherwise, if Ti = 0, they supply their devices with the fixed inputs x˜ and
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y˜. The probability mass function of the joint random variables X iYiTi, representing the ith
round’s inputs, is therefore
P [(X i,Yi,Ti)= (xi, yi, ti)]=

γµ(x, y) for (xi, yi, ti)= (x, y,1),
(1−γ) for (xi, yi, ti)= (x˜, y˜,0)
0 otherwise
. (3.3.2)
Following (3.3.1), if M is the seed length required to sample one of the m blocks of rounds,
then we have
E [M]≤
(
γH(µ)+h(γ))n
m
+3 (3.3.3)
where H(µ) is the Shannon entropy of the distribution µ and h(·) is the binary entropy.
The following lemma gives a probabilistic bound on the total length of the random seed
required to sample the inputs for the devices.
Lemma 3.7. Let the parameters of Protocol QRE be as defined in Fig. 3.3 and let kmax ∈N
be the maximum permitted seed length for an instance of the RIA. Then, with probability
greater than (1−²RIA), we can use m instances of the RIA to simulate the sampling of every
device input required to execute Protocol QRE with a uniform seed of length no greater than
Nmax, where
Nmax = 2κ (3.3.4)
²RIA = e−2κ
2/mk2max (3.3.5)
and κ= (γH(µ)+h(γ))n+3m. Moreover, the sampled distribution lies within a statistical
distance of
²dist =m2n log(supp(µ)+1)/m−(kmax+1), (3.3.6)
from the target distribution, where supp(µ) := |{(x, y) ∈XY |µ(x, y)> 0}|.
Proof. Consider the sequence (Mi)mi=1 of i.i.d. random variables representing the number of
random bits required to choose the inputs for the ith block and the corresponding random
sum N =∑mi=1 Mi. By (3.3.3), the expected number of bits required to select all of the inputs
for the protocol can be bounded above by κ = (γH(µ)+h(γ))n+ 3m. Using Hoeffding’s
inequality Lemma 2.2, we can bound the probability that N greatly exceeds this value,
P [N ≥ κ+ t]≤ e−2t2/mk2max ,
for some t> 0. Setting t= κ this becomes
P [N ≥ 2κ]≤ e−2κ2/mk2max .
Although κ is not exactly the expected value of N, which is the quantity appearing in
Hoeffding’s bound, the bound still holds as κ≥ E [N].
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It remains to bound the statistical distance between the sampled random variable
Iˆm1 = (Xˆ m1 , Yˆ m1 , Tˆm1 ) and the target random variable Im1 = (X m1 ,Y m1 ,Tm1 ). For each block of
rounds, the corresponding random variable I i can take one of a possible (supp(µ)+1)n/m
different values. Therefore, by Lemma 3.6, we have for the ith block of rounds
∆(I i, Iˆ i)≤ (supp(µ)+1)n/m2−(kmax+1)
= 2n log(supp(µ)+1)/m−(kmax+1)
Since ∆(P,Q) is a metric and hence satisfies the triangle inequality [51], the statistical
distance between independently repeated samples can grow no faster than linearly, i.e.,
∆(Im, I ′m)≤m∆(I, I ′).7 This completes the proof. 
7More specifically, we can iteratively apply the triangle inequality as follows
∆(Pn,Qn)≤∆(Pn,Pn−1Q)+∆(Pn−1Q,Qn)
=∆(P,Q)+∆(Pn−1,Qn−1).
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NOISE ROBUSTNESS OF THE FRAMEWORK AND FEASIBILITY OF
RANDOMNESS EXPANSION
This chapter looks at some explicit constructions of randomness expansion proto-cols. We model their implementation on systems of entangled qubits and comparetheir respective randomness expansion rates when exposed to inefficient detectors.
Towards the end of the chapter, we also investigate the question of whether net-positive
randomness expansion rates can be achieved using current technology.
4.1 Additional nonlocality tests
We begin by introducing two different nonlocality tests that will be included in the con-
structions alongside the extended CHSH game GCHSH (cf. Example 2.4). The first game,
which we refer to as the empirical behaviour game, provides the strongest possible device-
independent characterization of the untrusted devices.
Empirical behaviour game (GEB). The empirical behaviour game (GEB) is a nonlocal
game that estimates the underlying behaviour of DAB, i.e., it attempts to characterise
each individual probability p(a,b|x, y). We may construct this by associating with each
input-output tuple (a,b, x, y) ∈ABXY a corresponding score cab|xy ∈ G and defining the
scoring rule
VEB(a,b, x, y) := cab|xy,
for each (a,b, x, y) ∈ABXY . Then, for any input distribution µEB with full support on the
alphabets XY , the collection GEB = (µEB,VEB) forms a nonlocal game. Moreover, for agents
playing according to some strategy p ∈Q, the expected frequency distribution over the
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scores is precisely the joint distribution,
ωEB(a,b, x, y)=µEB(x, y)p(a,b|x, y)
= p(a,b, x, y).
As GEB can be defined for any collection of input-output alphabets, we indicate the size of
these alphabets as superscripts, i.e., G |X ||Y ||A||B|EB .1
Remark 4.1. The scoring rule for GEB, as defined above, has several redundant components,
see Fig. 4.1. In fact, there are only [(|A|−1)|X |+1][(|B|−1)|Y |+1]−1 free parameters [95].
Knowing this we can reduce the number of scores in our nonlocal game and, in turn, the
number of constraints we impose in our SDPs.2 Using the table presented in Fig. 4.1, we
can associate a score with every element that is not coloured. For the coloured elements we
can assign a score cnorm which normalizes the resulting frequency distribution.
In practice we are limited to collections of finite statistics and so we face a tradeoff
between how fine-grained of a characterization of our devices we choose to pursue and
how confident we are that our observations are not skewed by statistical fluctuations. As
a consequence, we may be required to collect substantially more test data if we want to
use nonlocality tests with larger score alphabets. The joint correlators game, which we now
introduce, offers an intermediate step between GCHSH and GEB.
Joint correlators game (G〈AB〉). Specifically, for each (x, y) ∈XY we define a score cxy
and a scoring rule
V〈AB〉(a,b, x, y) :=
cxy if a= bcnorm otherwise.
That is, for a pair of inputs (x, y) the score is recorded as cxy whenever the agents’ outcomes
agree. Otherwise, they record some normalization score cnorm. The input distribution can
then be specified as one sees fit: we shall use the uniform distribution over XY . We refer to
this game by the symbol G〈AB〉 and as before we will indicate the sizes of the input-output
alphabets as superscripts.
4.2 Comparison of protocols on noisy qubit systems
Let us now introduce a qubit implementation of the protocols that we will use to analyse
the noise robustness of the framework. We retain the protocol parameter choices from
the previous examples: n= 1010, γ= 5×10−3 and ²s = ²EAT = 10−8, except we now set the
1As we consider only binary output alphabets, we will not include their sizes in the superscript, i.e., we
will write G23EB instead of G2322EB .
2It is important to remove redundant constraints in practice as they can lead to numerical instabilities.
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P A
B|X
Y Y = 0 Y = 1 . . . Y = |Y |−1
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A
=
|A
|−
1
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Value determined from
∑
a p(a,b|x, y)=
∑
a p(a,b|x′, y) for all (b, x, y) ∈BXY
Value determined from
∑
b p(a,b|x, y)=
∑
b p(a,b|x, y′) for all (a, x, y) ∈AXY
Value determined from
∑
ab p(a,b|x, y)= 1 for all (x, y) ∈XY
Figure 4.1: Table showing redundant elements of a no-signalling distribution p ∈N.
confidence interval width parameter to
δk =
√
3ωk ln(2/εcomp)
γn
, (4.2.1)
in order to have a similar completeness error εcomp ≈ 10−12 across the different protocols.3
We suppose that the joint state of the devices at the start of each round is given by a pure,
non-maximally entangled state of the form
|ψ(θ)〉AB = cos(θ) |00〉+sin(θ) |11〉 , (4.2.2)
for θ ∈ (0,pi/2). We denote the corresponding density operator by ρθ = |ψ(θ)〉〈ψ(θ)|. For
simplicity we restrict to projective measurements within the x-z plane of the Bloch-sphere,
3In practice one would fix the soundness error of the protocol. However, because the soundness error is also
dependent on the extraction phase we instead assume independence of rounds and fix the completeness error.
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i.e., measurements {Π(ϕ),1−Π(ϕ)}, where
Π(ϕ)=
(
cos2(ϕ/2) cos(ϕ/2)sin(ϕ/2)
cos(ϕ/2)sin(ϕ/2) sin2(ϕ/2)
)
(4.2.3)
for ϕ ∈ (0,2pi]. We denote the projectors associated with the jth outcome of the ith mea-
surement by A j|i and B j|i. The elements of the devices’ behaviour can then be written
as
p(a,b|x, y)=Tr[ρθ(Aa|x⊗Bb|y)] . (4.2.4)
Noise within a randomness expansion protocol may come from several different sources:
within the creation and transmission of the states, as well as during the measurement
process. Whilst one can use heralding to account for losses incurred during state transmis-
sion, losses that occur within the secure laboratories (i.e. during the measurement process)
cannot be ignored without opening a detection loophole (cf. Sec. 2.5.2). Inefficient detectors
are a major contributor to the total experimental noise, so robustness to inefficient detectors
is a necessary property for any practical randomness expansion protocol. We characterize
detection efficiency by a single parameter η ∈ (0,1], representing the (independent) proba-
bility with which a measurement device successfully measures a received state and outputs
the result.4 We deal with failed measurements by assigning the outcome 0. Combining this
with (4.2.4), we may write the behaviour as
p(a,b|x, y)= η2 Tr[ρθ(Aa|x⊗Bb|y)]+ (1−η)2δ0aδ0b
+η(1−η)(δ0a Tr[ρθ(1⊗Bb|y)]+δ0b Tr[ρθ(Aa|x⊗ 1)]) . (4.2.5)
For each protocol we consider lower bounds on two quantities: the min-entropy produced
from a single interaction (before applying the EAT), Hmin(AB|XY E), and the EAT-rate,
H²smin(A
n
1 B
n
1 |X n1 Y n1 E)/n. The former quantity, which we refer to as the asymptotic rate,
represents the maximum accumulation rate achievable with our numerical technique. It
is a lower bound on H²smin(A
n
1 B
n
1 |X n1 Y n1 E)/n, specified by (3.2.7), as n→∞ and γ, δ→ 0.5
Comparing the asymptotic rate with the EAT-rate gives us a clear picture of the amount of
entropy that we lose due to the effect of finite statistics.
With inefficient detectors, partially entangled states can exhibit larger Bell-inequality
violations than maximally entangled states [96]. To account for this we optimize both
the state and measurement angles at each data point using the iterative optimization
procedure detailed in [97]. We relax all programs to the second level of the NPA hierarchy
and solve the resulting SDPs with the SDPA solver [84].
4For simplicity, we make the additional assumption that the detection efficiencies are constant amongst all
measurement devices used within the protocol.
5In principle, we would rather characterise H(AB|XY E) and the corresponding EAT-rate derived from
it. However, in general we don’t have suitable techniques to access these quantities in a device-independent
manner.
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(a) Comparison of G〈AB〉 protocols (b) Comparison of GEB protocols
(c) Comparison of protocols in the (2,3)-scenario
Figure 4.2: A plot of the asymptotic and EAT-rates for protocols using the nonlocal game
families G〈AB〉, GEB and GCHSH.
In Fig. 4.2a and Fig. 4.2b we see that in both families of protocols considered, an increase
in the number of inputs leads to higher rates. This increase is significant when moving
from the (2,2)-scenario to the (2,3)-scenario. However, continuing this analysis for higher
numbers of inputs we find that any further increases appear to have negligible impact on
the overall robustness of the protocol.6 Whilst all of the protocols achieve asymptotic rates
of 2 bits per round when η= 1,7 their respective EAT-rates at this point differ substantially.
In Fig. 4.2c we see a direct comparison between protocols from the different families. The
plot shows that, as expected, entropy loss is greater when using the nonlocality test G23EB as
opposed to the other protocols. In particular, for high values of η we find that we are able
6This could also be an artefact of the assumed restriction to qubit systems.
7More precisely, the asymptotic rates are 2(1−γ) bits per round.
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of the EAT-rates (cf. (3.2.7)) and their convergence to the asymptotic
rates for protocols based on different nonlocality tests. The rates were derived by assuming
a qubit implementation of the protocols with a detection efficiency of η= 0.9, optimizing the
state and measurement angles in order to maximise the asymptotic rate. Then, for each
value of n we optimized the min-tradeoff function and β parameter, recording the resulting
bound on H²smin. To ensure that we approach the asymptotic bound for increasing n, we
set γ= δ1 = ·· · = δ|G| = n−1/3. This choice also forces the completeness error to be constant
across all values of n.
to increase the certifiable entropy by considering fewer scores. However, it is still worth
noting that this entropy loss could be reduced by choosing a more generous set of protocol
parameters, e.g., increasing n and decreasing δ.
In practice, increasing n can be difficult due to restrictions on the overall runtime of the
protocol. Not only does it take longer to collect the statistics within the device-interaction
phase, but it may also increase the runtime of the extraction phase [98]. In Fig. 4.3 we
observe how quickly the various protocols converge on their respective asymptotic rates as
we increase n. Again we find that, due to finite-size effects, entropy loss is far greater for
G23EB than for the other protocols. In particular, we see that for protocols with fewer than 1010
rounds, it is advantageous to use G23〈AB〉. From the perspective of practical implementation,
Fig. 4.2c and Fig. 4.3 highlight the benefits of a flexible protocol framework. Looking at the
results, there is no best protocol for all scenarios. Rather, in order to maximise the quantity
of randomness gained, the user should utilise the flexible construction and design their
own protocol tailored to the scenario under consideration.
It is also important to compare the rates of instances of Protocol QRE with other proto-
cols from the literature, in particular the protocol of [26] (ARV). In [26], the min-tradeoff
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Figure 4.4: Comparison between the certifiable accumulation rates of QRNE protocols
based on GCHSH, G23EB and Protocol ARV from [26] on qubit systems with inefficient detec-
tors (cf. Fig. 4.2). The rates of Protocol ARV are also evaluated using the improved EAT
statement [25]. For Protocol ARV, we use the one-sided von Neumann entropy bound, so the
maximum rate is one bit per round, but because we can directly get the single-round von
Neumann entropy, the rate initially falls more slowly with decreasing detection efficiency
than for the other protocols.
functions are constructed from a tight bound on the single-party von Neumann entropy,
H(A|X E), which is given in terms of a CHSH inequality violation [72]. In Fig. 4.4 we
compare the rates of ARV with G22〈AB〉 and G23EB for entangled qubit systems with inefficient
detectors. To make our comparison fair, we have also computed the rates for Protocol ARV
using the improved EAT bound8. As the rates of Protocol ARV are derived from the entropy
accumulated by a single party their rates are capped at one bit per round.
In contrast, the semidefinite programs grant us access to bounds on the entropy pro-
duced by both parties and we are therefore able to certify up to two bits per round. In
Fig. 4.4, this advantage is observed in the high detection efficiency regime. Fig. 4.4 also
highlights a significant drawback of our technique, which stems from our use of the inequal-
ity H(AB|XY E) ≥ Hmin(AB|XY E). In particular, we see that for η < 0.9, the H(A|X E)
bound for the CHSH inequality is already greater than the Hmin(AB|XY E) established for
the empirical behaviour. Therefore, in the asymptotic limit (n→∞) the min-entropy bounds
for these protocols will produce strictly worse rates in this regime. For the finite n we have
chosen, n= 1010, it appears that for the majority of smaller η, it is advantageous to use the
8Note that we always use the direct bound on the von Neumann entropy when considering Protocol ARV,
rather than forming a bound via the min-entropy
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ARV protocol over the protocols derived from the framework. Nevertheless, looking at the
threshold detection efficiencies, i.e. the minimal detection efficiency required to achieve
positive rates, we find that some protocols from our framework are able to again beat the
rates established for Protocol ARV. Looking at the inset plot in Fig. 4.4 we see that G22〈AB〉
has a smaller threshold efficiency than that of Protocol ARV for the chosen protocol parame-
ters. Interestingly, this shows that G22〈AB〉 is capable of producing higher rates than Protocol
ARV in both the low and the high detection efficiency regimes, with the improvement for
low detection efficiencies being of particular relevance to experimental implementations.
Importantly, this shows that protocols from the framework are of practical use for finite n
in spite of the losses coming from the use of H(AB|XY E)≥Hmin(AB|XY E).
4.3 Net-positive expansion rates with current technologies
In recent years, a few experiments have reported implementations of randomness expan-
sion protocols [89,99] and the successful device-independent certification of randomness.
However, none of these experiments managed to fully account for the cost of seeding their
protocol and so a net-gain in entropy (or ‘expansion’) is yet to be seen.9 Here we investigate
the question as to whether expansion is possible using current technologies. By optimising
the protocol of [26], we find that net-positive rates are indeed within the capabilities of
current nonlocality experiments.
For this analysis we choose to move away from our framework and adapt the protocol of
Arnon-Friedman, Renner and Vidick [26] (Protocol ARV). In the security proof of Protocol
ARV a direct analytical bound on the von Neumann entropy for a single agent’s outputs is
established using the results of [72].
4.3.1 Protocol ARV
For clarity let us very briefly review the Protocol introduced in [26]. The protocol follows
the same spot-checking structure presented in Chapter 3, with both agents having binary
inputs and outputs. On test rounds the agents play the CHSH game and their respective
generation inputs are (x˜, y˜)= (0,0). We denote by ω ∈ [34 , 12 +
p
2
4 ] the agents’ expected score
for the CHSH game. By Equation (4.7) in [26] we can lower bound the von Neumann
entropy of a single interaction as
inf
σRi−1R′ :N testi (σ)Ci=τω
H(A iBi|X iYiR′)Ni(σ) ≥ 1−h
(
1
2
+ 1
2
√
16ω(ω−1)+3
)
(4.3.1)
where τω = (1−ω) |0〉〈0|+ω |1〉〈1|.
9In [99] the authors argue that costs of seeding the protocol are moot if one uses a public source of
randomness such as the NIST randomness beacon [100]. Whilst this may be true, one is then limited by the
speed of the public source. For the case of the NIST beacon this seed generation rate is 512 bits every 60
seconds. At this speed, for the protocol in Example 3.3 the accumulation stage would need to run for around
106 minutes or just under 2 years!
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In [26] this bound is used in conjunction with the original statement of the EAT [24].
To further improve upon the rates we use the improved EAT bound [25]. We note that the
adaptation of Protocol ARV to the improved EAT bound was already constructed in [25].
Our adaptation follows roughly the same procedure, with a few additional modifications to
further increase its practicality in the high noise regime.
Min-tradeoff function construction
Let g(ω) := 1−h (12 + 12p16ω(ω−1)+3 ), we can construct affine, entropy-bounding functions
from g by taking linear approximations at some point ν ∈
(
3
4 ,
1
2 +
p
2
4
)
. That is, we define
gν(ω) := g(ν)+ g′(ν)(ω−ν), (4.3.2)
with g′ = d gdω . As g is a convex function, gν will also lower bound the von Neumann
entropy H(A iBi|X iYiR′). Writing this in the language used within Chapter 3, we define
the constant αν = g(ν)−νg′(ν) and then
gν(δc)=
αν+ g
′(ν) for c= 1
αν for c= 0
. (4.3.3)
As g′(ν)> 0 for all ν ∈ (34 , 12 +
p
2
4 ) we immediately have Max[gν]=αν+ g′(ν).
Instead of applying Lemma 3.1 to gν in order to construct a min-tradeoff function, we
consider a more general extension. Let α,λ0,λ1,λ⊥ ∈R and define
fν(δc)=

α+λ1 for c= 1
α+λ0 for c= 0
α+λ⊥ for c=⊥
. (4.3.4)
The function fν is an arbitrary affine function on distributions over C = {1,0,⊥}. For fν to
also be a min-tradeoff function we require that if it is evaluated for any protocol respecting
distributions then it should bound the von Neumann entropy (cf. (2.3.6)). A sufficient
condition for this is that fν and gν are equal when evaluated at (γω,γ(1−ω),1−γ) and
(ω,1−ω) respectively. More explicitly, we require that for ω ∈ (34 , 12 +
p
2
4 ],
αv+ωg′(ν)=α+γωλ1+γ(1−ω)λ0+ (1−γ)λ⊥. (4.3.5)
As this must hold for all ω simultaneously, we may split this into two conditions:
αν =α+γλ0+ (1−γ)λ⊥ (4.3.6)
and
g′(ν)= γλ1−γλ0. (4.3.7)
Rearranging (4.3.6) we find that
λ0 = αν−α− (1−γ)λ⊥
γ
. (4.3.8)
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We may now also solve for λ1 in (4.3.7),
λ1 = g
′(ν)
γ
+ αν−α− (1−γ)λ⊥
γ
. (4.3.9)
Therefore, we may parametrize our extension by the pair (α,λ⊥), i.e.
fν(δc)=

α+ g′(ν)
γ
+ αν−α−(1−γ)λ⊥
γ
for c= 1
α+ αν−α−(1−γ)λ⊥
γ
for c= 0
α+λ⊥ for c=⊥
. (4.3.10)
We can then optimize our choice of min-tradeoff function not only over ν but also over the
parameters α and λ⊥.
Remark 4.2. The extension presented in Lemma 3.1 is equivalent to choosing α=αν and
λ⊥ = g′(ν).
4.3.2 A sharper completeness error
For δ> 0 and an expected CHSH score ω, the event that protocol ARV does not abort after
n rounds is
ΩARV = {Cn1 | γ(ω−δ)< FCn1 (1)}. (4.3.11)
In order to minimize the required runtime of the experiment we employ a stronger con-
centration bound to the task of computing the completeness error than that which was
used for the framework. The following lemma from [101] gives a good approximation to the
cumulative distribution function of a binomial process.
Lemma 4.1. Let X ∼Bin(n, p), then for every k= 0,1, . . . ,n−1 and every p ∈ (0,1), we have
Cn,p(k)≤P [X ≤ k]≤Cn,p(k+1) (4.3.12)
where
Cn,p(k) :=Φ
(
sgn
(
k
n − p
)√
2nD(k/n||p)
)
, (4.3.13)
with D(x||p) := x ln(x/p)+ (1− x) ln((1− x)/(1− p)) and Φ(x) := 1p
2pi
∫ x
−∞ e
−t2/2dt.
Corollary 4.1 (Completeness error). For 0< δ<ω, Protocol ARV has a completeness error
εcomp =Cn,γω
(⌈
γ(ω−δ)n⌉+1) . (4.3.14)
Proof. If an implementation of Protocol ARV is honest then FCn1 (1)∼ 1n Bin
(
n,γω
)
. So, the
probability the protocol aborts can be bounded above as
P
[
Ωc
]=P[FCn1 (1)≤ γ(ω−δ)]
=P
[
nFCn1 ≤ γ(ω−δ)n
]
≤P
[
nFCn1 ≤
⌈
γ(ω−δ)n⌉]
≤Cn,γω
(⌈
γ(ω−δ)n⌉+1) .
(4.3.15)

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4.3.3 Application to realistic parameter regimes
Through correspondence with the experimental group at the University of Science and
Technology of China [102] we gathered estimates for the current capabilities of photonics
based nonlocality experiments. They report a laser pulse of 2MHz (2×106 rounds per
second) with an expected CHSH score of 0.75132. Restricting the completeness error to
be no larger than 10−3 and ²s = ²EAT = 10−4, we used a numerical search to find a set
of parameters (n,γ,δ) which gave a positive net gain in entropy and, at the same time,
minimized n. This search was fairly rudimentary, we defined a lattice of points for (n,γ,δ)
and proceeded to calculate the net gain in entropy and the completeness error at each point.
We then took the point with the smallest n that had a completeness error less that 10−3
and which produced a positive net-rate. This numerical search found that the following
parameter choices,
Quantity Value
n 9.55×1011
γ 1.50×10−4
δ 2.24×10−4
εcomp 9.86×10−4
achieved a net-gain in entropy of 1.93×10−5 bits per round, with a total accumulation
procedure time of around 5 days. Which is within the bounds of current nonlocality exper-
iments – longer experiments would begin to suffer from stability issues and impractical
runtimes.
Fixing γ and δ, we can vary n to illustrate how the various improvements pushed the
rates into experimentally achievable regimes. In Fig. 4.5 we compare the two separate
derivations of the completeness errors. Observing where the two curves drop below a
completeness error of 10−3, we see that using the improved bound allows us to half the
overall number of rounds in our experiment. Similarly, in Fig. 4.6 we compare the two
separate statements of the EAT, [25] and [24]. By using the improved statement of the
entropy accumulation theorem we are able to achieve a net-gain in randomness using a
whole order of a magnitude fewer rounds.
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Figure 4.5: A comparison between the completeness error derived from Lemma 4.1 and the
completeness error derived from the Chernoff bound.
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Figure 4.6: A comparison of the net gain/loss in randomness certified when using the two
different statements of the EAT. The green line (DF bound) refers to the net randomness
rate certified using the improved EAT statement [25] whereas the orange line (DFR
bound) refers to the bound established in the appendix of [26], which relies on the original
statement of the EAT [24].
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CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
This thesis sought progress towards a more practical future for device-independent ran-
domness expansion. In Chapter 3, we introduced a framework for building quantum-secure
randomness expansion protocols. By combining device-independent bounds on the guessing
probability with the EAT, we were able to achieve full quantum security for spot-checking
protocols based on any nonlocality tests. Moreover, through semidefinite programming
techniques this procedure can be made computationally efficient. A key advantage of this
approach is that it allows a user to freely modify their choice of nonlocality test in order to
better accommodate the scenario within which they are generating randomness. This is
especially useful within the context of device-independence as we cannot assume an ability
to tune our untrusted devices to better fit pre-existing protocols. However, through this
flexible protocol construction, we may now tune our protocol to better fit the devices.
In Chapter 4 we introduced examples of protocols built within the framework. We
modelled their implementation on entangled qubit systems and analysed their robustness
to inefficient detectors – a significant source of noise in photonics-based implementations.
Our analysis showed a tradeoff between the complexity of the chosen nonlocality test and
our confidence in the resulting statistics collected over a finite number of trials. Whilst the
more complex nonlocality tests provide a stronger characterisation of the untrusted devices,
we found that their requirement for a large number of trials led them to be outperformed
by simpler tests when used within protocols with smaller numbers of rounds. Further
reinforcing the need for a user to be able to adapt the protocol to fit their available resources.
We also compared the rates of a selection of our protocols to the protocol presented in [26]
(ARV). Interestingly, we found that some of the protocols from the framework are able
to achieve higher rates than Protocol ARV in both the high and low detection efficiency
regimes. In particular, the higher rates for low detection efficiencies is of great importance
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Figure 5.1: A plot of tight lower bounds on H(A|X E) and Hmin(A|X E) in terms of the
CHSH score. The bound on H(A|X E) is given by (4.3.1) and the bound on Hmin(A|X E) is
taken from [18].
for actual experimental implementations.
Our analysis also led us to investigate the performance of current randomness expan-
sion experiments. Previous experiments [89,99] have reported successful device-independent
certification of randomness. However, no experiment has yet to demonstrate full random-
ness expansion, i.e. a net increase in total entropy. Through careful application of the
improved EAT statement [25] to the protocol of [26] we were able to find a set of protocol
parameters that could achieve full randomness expansion which were, crucially, within the
realms of current experimental capabilities [102].
Although the framework produces secure and robust protocols, there remains scope
for further improvements. For example, optimising the choice of min-tradeoff function
is a non-convex and not necessarily continuous problem [103]. Our analysis in Sec. 4.1
used a simple probabilistic gradient ascent algorithm to approach this problem. A more
sophisticated approach to this optimization could yield higher EAT-rates, particularly for
protocols with a higher number of scores, e.g., those which used the full behaviour as their
nonlocality test (GEB).
The construction of min-tradeoff functions using SDPs was made possible by the rela-
tion H(AB|XY E)≥Hmin(AB|XY E). Unfortunately, this inequality is not generally tight.
One can observe this difference in the context of the CHSH game, where H(AB|XY E)
and Hmin(AB|XY E) both admit an analytical form (see Fig. 5.1).1 Several alternative
approaches could be taken in order to reduce this loss. Firstly, the von Neumann entropy
1More recently, the authors of [104] showed that for this particular scenario one can also derive a tight
bound on the Rényi entropy of order 2, H2(A|X E). Moreover, their bound coincides with the bound for
Hmin(A|X E).
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and the min-entropy are special cases of a larger family of entropies, the Rényi entropies
Hα(AB|XY E) [50] and the relation H(AB|XY E)≥Hmin(AB|XY E) is part of a more gen-
eral ordering on this family,2 So, if we are able to develop efficient computational techniques
for computing device-independent lower bounds on some of these other entropies (those ly-
ing between H(AB|XY E) and Hmin(AB|XY E)) then this would likely lead to an immediate
improvement on the rates of certifiable randomness. In general, these quantities are more
difficult to evaluate than Hmin as they are nonlinear expressions of the quantum state.
One possible approach to this problem would be to introduce a density operator, which
acts as the quantum state shared between the untrusted devices, into the set of operators
considered within the NPA hierarchy. This would permit relaxations of expressions that
are nonlinear in the state, which could allow one to approximate Hα for fractional values
of α. Alternatively, one could directly introduce state nonlinear terms by including oper-
ators akin to 1〈Ma|x〉. This was recently proposed in [105] as a method of approximating
correlations emerging from quantum networks.
In certain scenarios, dimension-dependent bounds may also be applicable. For example,
it is known that for the special case of n-party, 2-input, 2-output scenarios it is sufficient
to consider qubit systems [72]. It may therefore be possible to derive results, analogous
to those of [72], for nonlocality tests such as the GHZ game [106]. Furthermore, with a
dimension bound one may be able to adapt the recent numerical techniques of [107] which
give robust lower bounds on the von Neumann entropy for device-dependent protocols.
As the framework permits protocols that rely on any nonlocality test, it is natural to
then search for tests that provide high randomness certification rates. Investigations into
the randomness certification properties of nonlocality tests with larger output alphabets or
additional parties could be of interest. However, increasing either of these parameters is
likely to increase the influence of finite-size effects. Alternatively, one could try to design
more economical nonlocality tests by combining scores that are of a lesser importance to
the task of certifying randomness. Intuitively, for a score c ∈ C, the magnitude of of λ(c) in
the min-tradeoff function indicates how important that score is for certifying entropy. If
|λ(c)| is large then this score is ‘important’ in the sense that any small deviations in the
expected frequency of that score, ω(c), will have a large impact on the amount of certifiable
entropy. Another approach to designing good nonlocality tests would be to take inspiration
from [37,38] wherein the authors showed how to derive the optimal Bell-expressions for
certifying randomness. A nonlocal game could then be designed to encode the constraints
imposed by this optimal Bell-expression. An example of such a game would be to assign a
score +1 to all (ABXY ) that have a positive coefficient in the optimal Bell-expression and
a score of −1 to all those with negative coefficients. The input distribution of the nonlocal
game could then be chosen as such to encode the relative weights of the coefficients.
2The Rényi entropies are one of many different entropic families that include the von Neumann entropy as
a limiting case. Any such family could be used if they satisfy an equivalent relation.
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Finally, our computational approach to the EAT considered only the task of randomness
expansion. Our work could be extended to produce adaptable security proofs for other
device-independent protocols. Given that the EAT has already been successfully applied to
a wide range of problems [29–31,73,108], developing good methods for robust min-tradeoff
function constructions represents an important step towards practical device-independent
security.
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Protocol notation
Notation Description
D A collection of untrusted devices.
G A nonlocal game.
QG Set of expected distributions over scores of G using quantum strategies.
Q(k)G Set of expected distributions over scores of G using strategies from Q(k).
ν,ω Expected distributions over scores of some nonlocal game G.
λν Dual feasible point of the guessing probability program parametrized by ν.
δ Vector of statistical confidence interval widths.
δ± δ with elements signed in accordance with a given λν.
A,B Devices’ output alphabets.
X ,Y Devices’ input alphabets.
n ∈N Number of rounds in the device-interaction phase.
γ ∈ (0,1) Probability that any given round is a test round.
A i,Bi Devices’ outputs for the ith round.
X i,Yi Devices’ inputs for the ith round.
Ci Score recorded for the ith round.
Ω Event that the protocol does not abort.
FCn1 Empirical frequency distribution arising from C
n
1 .
εcomp Completeness error of Protocol QRE.
εsound Soundness error of Protocol QRE.
²s Smoothing parameter for Hmin.
²EAT Tolerance of unlikely success events.
²V EAT error term (Variance).
²K EAT error term (Remainder).
²Ω EAT error term (Success probability).
Rext Strong quantum-secure randomness extractor.
²ext Extractor error.
`ext Entropy lost during extraction.
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FINITE PRECISION SECURITY
T framework of Chapter 3 bases its security on a numerical computation which,in practice, is at the mercy of finite precision computing. Rounding errors will bepresent within the computations and in the worst case they could surreptitiously
collude to overestimate the accumulated entropy, falsifying any subsequent security state-
ments. In this section we will show how to account for these errors, making the min-tradeoff
functions robust to finite precision computation.
Recall the generic semidefinite program
sup
X∈Sn(Rn)
Tr[CX ] ,
subject to. Tr[Fi X ]= bi for i ∈ 1, . . . , r,
X º 0,
(A.0.1)
and its dual form
inf
λ∈Rm
λT ·b
subject to. C−∑
i
λiFi ¹ 0
(A.0.2)
We would like to know how well the dual functional b′ 7→λ ·b′ preserves its upper-bounding
property (cf. (2.7.8)) when we allow for small perturbations in the constraints. To model
this we introduce an error parameter δ≥ 0. We then rewrite the dual program as
inf
λ∈Rm
λT ·b
subject to. C−∑
i
λiFi ¹ δ1
(A.0.3)
Now let bˆ be another constraint vector, let Xˆ be any feasible point of the primal program
constrained by bˆ and let pˆ=Tr[CXˆ]. In the error free dual program (A.0.2), we can apply
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the map M 7→Tr[Xˆ M] to the linear matrix inequality constraint to find that
pˆ≤λ · bˆ, (A.0.4)
i.e. the upper bounding property of the dual functional. Applying the same map to the
perturbed dual (A.0.3) we get
pˆ≤λ · bˆ+δTr[Xˆ] . (A.0.5)
Therefore, the amount to which the dual functional can fail to satisfy the upper bounding
property (A.0.4) is exactly δTr
[
Xˆ
]
. We now explain how to bound δ and Tr
[
Xˆ
]
.
Since most semidefinite programming solvers will report back the degree to which the
various constraints have been satisfied, the value of δ can be readily observed. A problem
is considered feasible in practice, if each of its constraints have been satisfied up to some
small perturbation. Roughly, an off-the-shelf SDP solver would consider a solution feasible
if δ is no greater than 10−5 ∼ 10−8. By using high precision solvers, e.g. those of the sdpa
family [84], one can further reduce the value of δ.
To bound the expression Tr
[
Xˆ
]
it helps to consider the actual SDP of interest, i.e. the
guessing probability program (2.7.13) relaxed to the kth level of the NPA hierarchy. In
this context, each element of Xˆ represents some expression of the form 〈ψ|M1M2 . . . Mn |ψ〉,
where |ψ〉 ∈H and M1, . . . , Mn are bounded, self-adjoint operators on some Hilbert space H.
For M ∈L(H), the operator norm of M is ‖M‖ = sup|ψ〉∈H{‖M |ψ〉‖ | ‖|ψ〉‖ ≤ 1}, if in addition
M is self-adjoint then we also have ‖M‖ = sup|ψ〉∈H{|〈ψ|M |ψ〉| : ‖|ψ〉‖ ≤ 1} (see Proposition
2.2 in [109]). Note that the operator norm is also sub-multiplicative, i.e. for M, N ∈L(H) we
have ‖MN‖ ≤ ‖M‖‖N‖. Therefore, for the element 〈ψ|M1M2 . . . Mn |ψ〉 of Xˆ we have
| 〈ψ|M1M2 . . . Mn |ψ〉 | ≤ ‖ψ‖‖M1M2 . . . Mn |ψ〉‖
≤ ‖M1M2 . . . Mn‖
≤ ‖M1‖‖M2‖ . . .‖Mn‖
(A.0.6)
where the first line follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality | 〈ψ|φ〉 | ≤ ‖|ψ〉‖‖|φ〉‖.
Furthermore, as each Mi is POVM element, we have 0≤ 〈ψ|Mi |ψ〉 ≤ 1 and so ‖Mi‖ ≤ 1. It
follows that every element of Xˆ is bounded by 1. If Xˆ is a d×d matrix, we have Tr[Xˆ]≤ d.
It remains to bound the size of Xˆ . Recall that for the kth level of the hierarchy, Xˆ is
indexed by all unique products of operators of length no larger than k. The generating set
of operators forms the 1st level of the hierarchy, in our case this isW (1) = {1}∪{Ea|x}(a,x)∈AX∪
{Fb|y}(b,y)∈BY , i.e. the POVM elements that form our distribution p(a,b|x, y)=Tr
[
ρ(Ea|xFb|y)
]
.
In fact, we are at liberty to use a slightly smaller set: after choosing some (a′,b′) ∈AB, let
A′ =A\{a′} and B′ =B\{b′} and define
W˜ (1) = {1}∪ {Ea|x}(a,x)∈A′X ∪ {Fb|y}(b,y)∈B′Y .
Where we have removed the operators {Ea′|x}x∈X∪{Fb′|y}y∈Y as they can be constructed from
linear combinations of the remaining operators, i.e. Ea′|x = 1−∑a∈A′ Ea|x. This reduction of
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the generating set is a consequence of Lemma 7 in [41], which states that if a certificate
exists for a word set W then a certificate will also exist for a word set W˜ where each word
in W˜ is a linear combination of words from W . By decreasing the size of Xˆ we speed up the
computation and reduce the impact of floating point errors.
For the 1st level of the hierarchy, Xˆ is a d(1)×d(1) matrix with
d(1) = 1+ (|A|−1)|X |+ (|B|−1)|Y |.
The second level of the hierarchy is indexed by all words present at the first level together
with all unique, non-trivial products of operators of length 2. There are two sources of
redundancy here: we assume that our measurements are projective and the measurement
operators for separate parties commute. The projective assumption means that when we
only consider a single party, the only nontrivial products are those formed from operators
that correspond to different inputs. Therefore, at the second level of the hierarchy there are
(|A|−1)|X |× (|A|−1)(|X |−1) new words of the form Ea|xEa′|x′ ; (|B|−1)|Y |× (|B|−1)(|Y |−1)
new words of the form Fb|yFb′|y′ and (|A| −1)(|B| −1)|X ||Y | words of the form Ea|xFb|y.
Meaning that,
d(2) = 1+ (|A|−1)|X |+ (|B|−1)|Y |
+ (|A|−1)2|X |(|X |−1)+ (|B|−1)2|Y |(|Y |−1)+ (|A|−1)(|B|−1)|X ||Y |.
In general d(k) will grow exponentially with the level of the hierarchy. This means that
for higher levels of the hierarchy we may have to use a higher precision solver to curb
non-negligible error propagation.1 Fortunately, all of our computations were performed at
the 2nd level of the hierarchy and so the product δTr
[
Xˆ
]
was always small for the size of
input and output alphabets.
Remark A.1. Actually, for the guessing probability program (2.7.13), the certificate Xˆ is
composed of |AB| blocks, i.e. Xˆ =⊕ab∈AB Xˆab – one block for each subnormalized distribu-
tion p˜ab ∈Q(k), with the block Xˆab corresponding to a NPA certificate for the distribution
p˜ab. To account for the subnormalization of p˜ab, each block is weighted by the norm
|p˜ab| =
∑
a′b′ p˜ab(a′,b′|x, y). However, as Tr
[
Xˆ
] =∑ab |p˜ab|Tr[Xˆab], we can upper bound
Tr
[
Xˆ
]
by just considering a single (normalized) block.
1Larger matrices and higher precision solvers will have a compounding negative effect on the speed of
computation.
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AN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FRAMEWORK IN PYTHON
To facilitate the framework’s use, a python implementation was developed and re-leased [42]. The package provides a user-friendly means of designing and computingthe relevant security quantities of framework based protocols. We now provide a
short overview of the package including its basic structure and functionality.
The package is built around three core objects: games, devices and protocols.
Games
The game object allows a user to specify a real-valued nonlocal game, an expected score for
this game and a statistical confidence in that expected score. The scoring rule V :ABXY→
R is specified by supplying a matrix of coefficients following the same indexing pattern
present in Fig. 4.1. E.g., for the CHSH game (cf. Ex. 2.3) this would be

0.25 0 0.25 0
0 0.25 0 0.25
0.25 0 0 0.25
0 0.25 0.25 0
 . (B.0.1)
To implement games with multiple scores one would create a collection of game objects, one
for each score. For example, the game G〈AB〉 for binary ABXY can be implemented with 4
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game objects for each of its separate scores whose coefficient matrices are
0.25 0 0 0
0 0.25 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 ,

0 0 0.25 0
0 0 0 0.25
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 ,

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0.25 0 0 0
0 0.25 0 0
 ,

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0.25 0
0 0 0 0.25
 .
As we have weighted the coefficients with the input distribution (assumed uniform), the
expected scores for these individual games refer to the relative frequency of the score they
represent. The normalization score will be handled automatically by the program.
Devices
The devices object is initialized by supplying a list of attributes including: the input-output
configuration, the generation inputs, any nonlocal games played by the device and a desired
SDP relaxation level. Once initialized, the code uses another package ‘ncpol2sdpa’ [110]
to create a relaxation of the guessing probability program corresponding to the specified
attributes. A user may then request the guessing probability or min-entropy generated
when the generation inputs are used, the program then solves the SDP and returns the
relevant value. A user is free to alter the devices’ attributes post-initialization, upon
doing so the program automatically updates the guessing probability program and any
subsequent requests for the min-entropy will take into account these changes.
Protocol
The protocol object stores all of the additional protocol parameters required by Protocol QRE
including: number of rounds, testing probability, ²s and ²EAT.
Usage
Once the protocol and device objects have been initialized, a user can begin to compute
quantities relevant to Protocol QRE. In particular, the completeness error and all of the
relevant EAT quantities (3.2.7) – (3.2.10) may be computed for a specified min-tradeoff
function from Fmin. The default min-tradeoff function is the one indexed by the expected
scores provided. The code also implements a rudimentary gradient ascent algorithm to
optimize the choice of min-tradeoff function, this was used in Ex. 3.2 and Fig. 3.2.
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BLOCKING THE SPOT-CHECKING PROTOCOL
The original statement of the entropy accumulation theorem [24] was releasedalongside an accompanying work, [26], which detailed its application to securityproofs of device-independent protocols. Within the appendix of [26] it was shown
that one could increase the quantity of entropy certified by the original EAT through a
modification to the structure of the spot-checking protocol. In light of this the authors
of [25] improved the second order term of the EAT in order to account for the suboptimal
dependence on the testing probability that was highlighted by the structural modification.
In the sections that follow, we show how the family of min-tradeoff functions Fmin can
be adapted to this structural change. Furthermore, we compare the accumulation rates
achievable with the different structures and EAT statements. In particular, we show that
this structural change provides no clear benefits when using the improved EAT statement.
To clearly distinguish the different statements of the EAT, we shall indicate with the
subscript DFR16, quantities associated with the original EAT [24] and similarly we shall
indicate with the subscript DF18, quantities associated with the newer EAT statement [25].
C.1 Blocked min-tradeoff functions
Let us briefly review the structural modification that was introduced in [26]. Instead of
distinguishing the statistics from each interaction separately, rounds are grouped together
to form blocks. The number of rounds within a block can vary: a new block begins when
either a test-round occurs or when the maximum number of rounds permitted within a
block, smax, is reached. On expectation there are s¯= 1−(1−γ)
smax
γ
rounds within a block. The
device-interaction phase of the protocol concludes after some specified number of blocks
m ∈ N have terminated. We shall use the superscripts R and B to indicate whether a
89
APPENDIX C. BLOCKING THE SPOT-CHECKING PROTOCOL
quantity is concerned with the round-by-round or block structured protocols respectively.
The collected information is now defined at the level of blocks and not rounds. In
particular, at the end of the ith block the user records some tuple (A i,Bi,X i,Y i,C i), where
(A i,Bi,X i,Y i) ∈AsmaxBsmaxX smaxY smax and the scoring alphabet remains the same as in the
main text C i ∈G∪ {⊥}. The EAT-channels are now defined for each block and the entropy
bounding property of min-tradeoff function (cf. (2.3.6) and (2.3.7)) becomes
f Bmin(p)≤ inf
σRi−1R′ :Ni(σ)Ci=τp
H(A iBi|X iY iR′)Ni(σ), (C.1.1)
for each i ∈ [m]. The expected frequency distributions for a block’s score take the form
pB =
(
γs¯q
(1−γ)smax
)
(C.1.2)
for q ∈QG .
Lemma C.1 (Blocked variant of Lemma 3.1). Let g :PG→R be an affine function satisfying
g(q)≤ inf
σRi−1R′ :N testi (σ)Ci=τq
H(A iBi|X iY iR′)Ni(σ) (C.1.3)
for all q ∈QG . Then the function f :PG∪{⊥} →R, defined by
f (δc)=Max[g]+ g(δc)−Max[g]
γs¯
, ∀c ∈G,
f (δ⊥)=Max[g],
is a min-tradeoff function for any EAT-channels implementing Protocol QREB. Furthermore,
f satisfies the following properties:
Max[ f ]=Max[g],
MinΣ[ f ]≥Min[g],
VarΣ[ f ]≤ (Max[g]−Min[g])
2
γs¯
.
Proof. This follows from replicating the original proof [25] with the block channels decom-
posed into the testing and generation channels, Ni = γs¯N testi + (1−γs¯)N geni . 
Lemma C.2 (Min-tradeoff construction). Let G be a nonlocal game and k ∈ N. For each
ν ∈ Q(k)G , let λν be some feasible point of the dual of Prog. (2.7.13) when parametrized
by ν and computed at the kth relaxation level. Furthermore, let λmax =maxc∈G λν(c) and
λmin =minc∈G λν(c). Then, for any set of EAT channels {Ni}mi=1 implementing an instance of
Protocol QREB with the nonlocal game G, the set of functionals FBmin(G)= { fν(·) | ν ∈Q(k)G }
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forms a family of min-tradeoff functions, where fν :PC→R are defined by
fν(δc) := (1−γ) s¯
(
Aν−Bνλν(c)− (1−γs¯)λmin
γs¯
)
for c ∈G,
(C.1.4)
fν(δ⊥) := (1−γ) s¯ (Aν−Bνλmin) ,
(C.1.5)
where Aν = 1ln2 − log(λν ·ν) and Bν = 1λν·ν ln2 .
Moreover, these min-tradeoff functions satisfy the following identities.
• Maximum:
Max[ fν]= (1−γ)s¯(Aν−Bνλmin) (C.1.6)
• Σ-Minimum:
MinΣ[ fν]≥ (1−γ)s¯(Aν−Bνλmax) (C.1.7)
• Σ-Variance:
VarΣ[ fν]≤
(1−γ)2 s¯B2ν(λmax−λmin)2
γ
(C.1.8)
Proof. The proof follows the same structure as the proof of Lemma 3.2. The only significant
difference is the construction of the function g : PG → R satisfying (C.1.3) so we shall
explain this part here. Following Appendix B of [26], by repeated application of the chain
rule we may decompose a block’s entropy as
H(A iBi|X iY iT iR′)Ni(σ) =
smax∑
j=1
(1−γ) j−1H(A i, jBi, j|X iY i,T j−1i,1 = 0,T
smax
i, j A
j−1
i,1 B
j−1
i,1 R
′),
where Ti, j is the random variable indicating whether a test occurred on the jth round of
the ith block. Considering the individual terms within the sum, we can absorb the majority
of the side information into some arbitrary quantum register E leaving us with terms of
the form
(1−γ) j−1H(A i, jBi, j|X i, jYi, jTi, jE).
As before, we can use the inequality H(A|B)≥Hmin(A|B) and conditioning on Ti, j to lower
bound each term in the sum by a feasible point of the semidefinite program,
(1−γ) j−1H(A i, jBi, j|X i, jYi, jTi, jE)= (1−γ) j−1P
[
Ti, j = 0
]
H(A i, jBi, j|X i, j = x˜,Yi, j = y˜,Ti, j = 0,E)
+ (1−γ) j−1P[Ti, j = 1]H(A i, jBi, j|X i, jYi, jTi, j = 1 E)
≥ (1−γ) jH(A i, jBi, j|x˜ y˜E)
≥ (1−γ) jHmin(A i, jBi, j|x˜ y˜E)
≥−(1−γ) j log(λν ·qi, j),
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where qi, j ∈QG is the expected frequency distribution over the game scores for round j of
block i. Noting that − log(·) of an linear function is convex [82], we can establish a bound
on the entire block i through an application of Jensen’s inequality1
(γ−1)
smax∑
j=1
(1−γ) j−1 log(λν ·qi, j)≥ s¯(γ−1)log
(
λν ·
∑smax
j=1 (1−γ) j−1qi, j
s¯
)
we have used the fact that
∑
j∈[smax](1−γ) j−1 = s¯. Let qi ∈QG be the expected nonlocal game
score for the ith block conditioned on a test occurring. We may write qi as
qi =
∑
j∈[smax]γ(1−γ) j−1qi, j
1− (1−γ)smax ,
=
∑
j∈[smax](1−γ) j−1qi, j
s¯
.
Thus, we have so far established that
H(A iBi|X iY iT iR′)Ni(σ) ≥ s¯(γ−1)log
(
λν ·qi
)
,
where qi ∈QG is the expected frequency distribution over the nonlocal game scores for the
ith block. Taking a first order expansion about the point ν we arrive at the bound
H(A iBi|X iY iT iR′)Ni(σ) ≥ (1−γ)s¯(Aν−Bνλν ·qi),
where Aν = 1ln2 − log(λν ·ν) and Bν = 1λν·ν ln2 . Note that the right hand side is a device-
independent bound (does not refer to the state and measurements of the system), therefore
it is also a bound on infσRi−1R′ :N testi (σ)Ci=τq H(A iBi|X iY iT iR
′)Ni(σ). The prerequisites of
Lemma C.1 are now satisfied and the result follows from applying the lemma to the
constructed entropy-bounding function above. 
Remark C.1. The min-tradeoff functions for the blocked protocol are very similar to those
of Lemma 3.2. If p ∈QG then
f Bν (γs¯p,1−γs¯)= s¯ f Rν (γp,1−γ).
That is, evaluating the corresponding min-tradeoff functions for distributions which respect
the structure of the protocols, we get that the blocked function’s bound is precisely s¯ times
the round-by-round bound.
1Jensen’s inequality [111] states that for a function ϕ : R→ R, continuous and convex on some interval
I ⊆R, we have
ϕ
(∑n
i=1αi xi∑n
i=1αi
)
≤
∑n
i=1αiϕ(xi)∑n
i=1αi
,
where xi ∈ I and αi > 0 for each i ∈ [n].
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C.2 Blocking with the improved second order
The error term in the original EAT bound is
²RDFR16 := 2(log(1+2|A||B|)+d‖∇ fmin‖∞e)
√
1−2log(²s²EAT) . (C.2.1)
The disadvantage of using this bound without modification is that the gradient of fmin
scales like 1/γ and so the total error
p
n ²RDFR16 scales as O(
p
n /γ). What was noticed in [26]
is that by collating the statistics into m ∈ N blocks, one can redistribute some of the γ
dependence from the gradient term to the log(1+2|A||B|) term such that the total error
scales as O(
√
n
y ). Moving to the blocked structure and setting smax =
⌈
1/γ
⌉
, the output
alphabets grow exponentially with the size of the blocks and therefore logarithmic term
acquires a 1/γ scaling. In contrast, the scaling of the derivative of the min-tradeoff function
is found to be independent of the block size. Fortunately, as our error is now defined for an
entire block, we reduce the multiplicative factor on the total error from
p
n to
p
m ≈pn/s¯ .
As s¯ ∈O(1/γ), we find that the total error termpm ²BDFR16 now scales as
√
n/γ . By increasing
the size of the blocks we have effectively redistributed the testing probability dependence
evenly amongst the components of ²DFR16.
In light of this block-induced improvement, it is natural to investigate whether similar
advantages can be obtained by applying this technique to the improved EAT statement [25].
Recall the error terms
²RV :=
β ln2
2
(
log
(
2|AB|2+1)+√VarΣ[ f ]+2 )2 , (C.2.2)
²RK :=
β2
6(1−β)3 ln2 2
β(log |AB|+Max[ f ]−MinΣ[ f ]) ln3
(
2log |AB|+Max[ f ]−MinΣ[ f ]+ e2
)
(C.2.3)
and
²RΩ :=
1
β
(1−2log(pΩ ²s)) . (C.2.4)
Using the explicit form of the blocked min-tradeoff functions Lemma C.2, we can calculate
the approximate size of the error terms for large smax, small γ and m≈ nR /s¯. In particular,
we find
m ·²BV ≤
βm ln2
2
(
log
(
2|AB|2smax +1)+
√
(1−γ)2 s¯B2ν(λmax−λmin)2
γ
+2
)2
=O(βnsmax)+O(βn/γ),
(C.2.5)
m ·²BK ≤
mβ2
6(1−β)3 ln2 2
β(log |AB|smax+(1−γ)s¯Bν(λmax−λmin)) ln3
(
2log |AB|
smax+(1−γ)s¯Bν(λmax−λmin)+ e2
)
=β22O(βsmax)O(ns2max),
(C.2.6)
²BΩ =O(1/β), (C.2.7)
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and therefore the total error scales as
O
(
βnsmax+ βn
γ
+β2ns2max2O(βsmax)+
1
β
)
. (C.2.8)
In order for ²BK to have any sensible scaling, we need the exponent to grow no faster
than O(1). Combining this with the inverse dependence of β in ²BΩ, we would like β≈
p
γp
n smax
.
Such a choice results in the total error scaling as O
(
smax
√
n/γ
)
which suggests that a large
block size is not advantageous with the improved second order statement.
A comparison between the expansion rates obtained when using the improved second
order statement [25] and the blocked variant of the original EAT are presented in Fig. C.1.
The faster convergence to the asymptotic rate is indicative of the new EAT statement’s
strength. Additionally, in Fig. C.2 we extend Fig. 4.6 from Sec. 4.3 to compare the four
variants of the EAT, i.e. each statement with and without blocking.
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Figure C.1: Comparison of the certifiable accumulation rates using the two different
statements of the EAT: DFR16B [26] and DF18R (3.2.7). The rates were derived using the
following procedure. We assumed a qubit implementation of the protocols with a detection
efficiency η= 0.9, optimizing the state and measurement angles in order to maximise the
asymptotic bound. Then, for each value of n an optimization of the min-tradeoff function
choice was performed – for the rates calculated using (3.2.7) we also optimized the β
parameter at each value of n. To ensure that we approached the asymptotic bound as n
increased we set γ= δ1 = ·· · = δ|G| = n−1/3 as such a choice provides a constant completeness
error across all values of n.
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Figure C.2: Comparison between the certifiable accumulation rates of Protocol ARV (see
Sec. 4.3) using the blocked and non-blocked variants of the two EAT statements. The
dashed lines indicate that the EAT statement was applied to the blocked version of the
spot-checking protocol whereas the filled lines indicate the EAT statement was applied
round-by-round.
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ADDITIONAL LEMMAS
Lemma D.1. Let X ,Y ∈Sn(R) then
inf
Yº0
Tr[XY ] =
0 if X º 0−∞ otherwise (D.0.1)
Proof. By the spectral theorem we can rewrite X as X =∑iλi |xi〉〈xi|.
Case: X º 0.
As X º 0 we have that λi ≥ 0 for each i ∈ [n] and we may define X1/2 = ∑i√λi |xi〉〈xi|,
which satisfies X = X1/2X1/2 and X1/2 º 0. By the cyclic property of the trace we have
Tr[XY ] = Tr[X1/2Y X1/2] which is non-negative as X1/2Y X1/2 º 0: for |v〉 ∈ Rn we have
〈v|X1/2Y X1/2 |v〉 = 〈w|Y |w〉 ≥ 0 with |w〉 = X1/2 |v〉.
Case: X  0.
If X  0 then at least one of its eigenvalues {λi} is negative. Let λ be one of those negative
eigenvalues and define Y = yΠλ where Πλ is the projector onto the eigenspace of λ. For
y≥ 0 we have Y º 0. Moreover, Tr[XY ]= yλdλ where dλ is the dimension of the eigenspace
of λ. Then infYº0 Tr[XY ]= infy≥0 yλdλ =−∞ as λ< 0. 
Lemma D.2. Let f :Rn×Rm →R, V ⊆Rn and W ⊆Rm, then
sup
v∈V
inf
w∈W
f (v,w)≤ inf
w∈W
sup
v∈V
f (v,w). (D.0.2)
Proof. Let g−(v) := infw∈W f (v,w) and g+(w) := supv∈V f (v,w). Then, by definition, for any
(v,w) ∈VW we have
g−(v)≤ f (v,w)≤ g+(w).
As g−(v)≤ g+(w) holds for all (v,w) ∈VW , we must also have g−(v)≤ infw∈W g+(w) and in
turn supv∈V g−(v)≤ infw∈W g+(w). 
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Lemma D.3. Let λ ∈Rn and let Λ= {x ∈Rn |λ · x> 0}. Then,
f (x) :=− log(λ · x) (D.0.3)
is a convex function on Λ.
Proof. Firstly, note that Λ is a convex set. Furthermore, f is a smooth function on Λ and so
we can compute its Hessian,
H = 1
ln2
(
λiλ j
(λ · x)2
)
i, j
.
We may rewrite this as H = 1ln2 |v〉〈v| with |v〉 = 1λ·x
∑
iλi |i〉. Consequently, H is a rank one
matrix with a single non-zero eigenvalue 1ln2‖|v〉‖2 =
∑
i λ
2
i
ln2(λ·x)2 . This eigenvalue is manifestly
non-negative and thus H º 0 and f is a convex function on Λ. 
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